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This thesis attempts to theorize the relationship between conceptual metaphors, defined 
as inference-preserving cross-domain mappings (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), and the 
idea of rationality.  Based on the broad claim that metaphorical reasoning is a 
fundamental and pervasive mechanism of human cognition, conceptual metaphor theory 
has been held to warrant a revision of traditional “objectivist” conceptions of rationality 
(Lakoff 1987, Indurkhya 2007), although a formal attempt elaborating how this may be 
done has not been made.  Pursuant to this purpose, I claim that conceptual metaphors 
can be strategically employed in the structuring of knowledge/belief systems in a 
manner which facilitates the fulfilment of a working set of rationality criteria, although 
metaphors are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality.  In arriving at such a 
working set of criteria, I first make the observation that there exists an ideologically 
momentous tendency to conflate rationality with scientificity (e.g.  Harris 2005, 
Dawkins 2006) resulting in an overly constrictive view of what it means for a system to 
be rational, as well as an uncritical tendency to categorically dismiss non-science as 
irrational.  In its place, I advocate a more schematic conception which does not treat 
non-scientific systems as inherently problematic, while emphasizing notions such as 
systemization and logical validity (e.g. Weber 1922, Elster 1983).   
After providing examples of how various systems employ metaphors in the fulfilment 
of my four working criteria, I offer a case study of the Chinese divinatory system of Ba 
Zi and its employment of the source domain of “elemental properties”.  Issues emergent 
from the case study, such as the socio-historical aspects of homology formation in 
metaphor and the persuasive dimension of rationality-facilitating metaphors offer 
alternative routes of inquiring into the relationship between metaphor and rationality.  
In this spirit I provide further suggestions for future research that would theorize this 
relationship in a different manner, including the investigation of how rationality and its 
attendant criteria are themselves structured by metaphor, and the construal of rational 
systems as a prototype-based category (Rosch, 1973) sensitive to various idealized 
cognitive models (Lakoff 1987).  I conclude the thesis by briefly commenting on the 
additional light it has hopefully shed on pertinent issues, such as the role of human 
construal in rational knowledge, the reliability of rational knowledge and the possible 
interactions between metaphor and metonymy in relation to rationality.  





CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 RATIONALITY AND THE SCIENTIFIC-NONSCIENTIFIC DIVIDE 
Rational inquiry, or the advancement and justification of claims about the world based 
on reason, has strongly characterized knowledge creation in a post-enlightenment world.  
Research in scientific and academic contexts fundamentally relies on “rational” modes 
of inquiry in the discovery, endorsement and subsequent dissemination of knowledge.  
If rationality primarily involves systemization (Weber, 1922), and ideology refers to a 
“systematically organized presentation of reality” (Hodge and Kress, 1993: 15), then 
the notion of rationality is not only a key feature of dominant scientific ideologies 
(Rollin, 2006), but lies at the very foundation of ideology formation itself.  Any 
ideological presentation which seeks to prescribe an idealized worldview always lays 
claim to being rational.   And, that which is labelled rational is seen as inherently ideal, 
accurate and trustworthy, the pursuit of which becomes an imperative.  The opposite 
effect triggered by a polarized use of the label, then, is the categorization of other 
practices and belief systems as “irrational”, with the attendant negative attributes. 
Recently, in what has been perceived by some as an overzealous expression of 
“ideological scientism” (e.g. Robinson, Holloway, 2006), individuals such as 
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, science historian Michael Shermer and science 
writer Sam Harris have, through their writings, made the ideological divide between the 
“rational” and “irrational” even more pronounced.  A common tendency that runs 
through their work is to highlight the irrationality of religious values and beliefs, and 
the drastic consequences these supposedly bring.  Dawkins, for example, cites religious 
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indoctrination – both the practice itself and the contents transmitted via the practice – as 
logically absurd and tantamount to child abuse: 
… the idea that baptizing an unknowing, uncomprehending child can change him 
from one religion to another at a stroke seems absurd – but it is surely not more 
absurd than labelling a tiny child as belonging to any particular religion in the first 
place… (Dawkins, 2006:354) 
… isn’t it always a form of child abuse to label children as possessors of beliefs 
that they are too young to have thought about?  Yet the practice persists to this day, 
almost entirely unquestioned. (Dawkins, 2006:354) 
Likewise, Harris and Shermer highlight that religious faith can be used as justification 
for destructive activities aimed at those who oppose the faith. Harris (2005:112), for 
example, observes the “intrinsic militancy” of Islam and contends that “given the long 
history of conflict between Islam and the West, almost any act of violence against 
infidels can now be plausibly construed as an action in defense of the faith”.  
Following recent geopolitical developments accentuated by but not confined to the 
September 11 attacks and other activities linked to global terrorism, the characterization 
of religious fundamentalism and religious faith in general as irrational has become an 
increasingly tenable position.  By emphasizing religious faith as an exemplar of 
irrationality, delusion, evil and immorality1, these influential contemporary writers have 
successfully created a backdrop against which scientific inquiry can be championed as a 
paragon of rationality and human progress.  Emergent from this is a polarized 
                                                           
1
 Incidentally, some of Richard Dawkin’s recent works include a book (“The God Delusion”) and a 
documentary (“Root of All Evil?”), referring to religious faith although he disclaims responsibility for 
naming the latter. 
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categorization of knowledge and belief systems into either rational thus desirable, or 
irrational and thus undesirable.  In the absence of critical examination, characteristics of 
scientific inquiry proceed to assume the guise of an undisputed set of rationality criteria, 
leading to a collective and monopolistic grip of “science” on rationality.   
It is perhaps unsurprising that key maxims of scientific inquiry such as confirmability, 
inter-subjective validity and falsifiability, which presuppose and perpetuate the 
perception of a regular, systematic and rule-governed universe, intuitively conform to 
our everyday understanding and experience with the world.  To the extent that everyday 
objects, categories and phenomena remain relatively stable, it seems both necessary and 
sufficient to inductively construe the world as such – an immutable and ontologically 
well-demarcated collection of objective entities.  It makes sense to suppose that rational 
thought is simply that which mirrors objective reality, and rational knowledge/beliefs 
are simply those that come about through procedures tailored to probe this reality (i.e. 
science).  Such indeed were the main tenets of logical positivism and analytic 
philosophy, both of which have had a profound impact on Western thought especially in 
the past century.  Against the weight of this philosophical and intellectual tradition, 
which doubtlessly influenced writers like Dawkins et al., rationality criteria seemed 
fairly certain to be intrinsically scientific.   
However, limiting the ambit of the concept of “rationality” to the domain of objective 
physical reality is surely too constrictive, as most social scientists would readily testify.  
In his classic study on the bureaucratization of Western societies, Max Weber (1922) 
observes that abstract patterns of systematicity and standardization typical of physical 
science characterize human societies as well.  Although the social-scientific method is 
in many ways directly modelled on the physical sciences, inherent differences between 
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social phenomena and physical phenomena necessitate the outlining of a more 
schematic set of rationality criteria, able to accommodate distinct and perhaps mutually 
“incommensurable” (Kuhn, 1962)  systems of inquiry.  Plainly speaking, while the 
scientific method is certainly rational, it does not necessarily follow that a rational 
system has to be scientific.   
In recent decades, a growing body of research in cognitive psychology, linguistics and 
related fields has produced insights that crucially intersect the notion of rationality, 
amongst them the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor (CMT) (Lakoff, 1993), which 
this thesis is most directly concerned with.  The reason for this “crucial intersection”, as 
I have put it, lies in CMT’s central claims (i) that metaphor is universally pervasive in 
both everyday language and the language of abstract concepts; and, (ii) that this is a 
natural consequence of the fact that metaphorical reasoning is a fundamental 
mechanism of human cognition.  Conceptual domains ranging from life through love to 
temporality have been empirically shown to be structured in terms of other domains 
such as journeys and spatiality (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999), across many cultures 
and languages. Experimental evidence also exists to demonstrate a neurological basis 
for a mapping mechanism (Narayanan, 1997).  Both (i) and (ii) appear to run contrary 
to the “objectivist conception of rationality” (Lakoff, 1987), which would contend that 
rational language and thought (ought to) directly mirror objective reality.  Instead, CMT 
claims that much of our understanding involves inference-preserving mappings across 
different conceptual domains. CMT has thus attempted to shift the conception of what it 
means to be rational from one that definitionally precludes metaphor, to one where 
metaphor is not only pervasively manifested in language, but perhaps entirely necessary 
for thought.  On the basis of these claims, attempting to negotiate a set of rationality 
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criteria purely along the scientific-nonscientific front without considering the 
potentially significant role of metaphor seems short-sighted.  Remarking the 
pervasiveness and seeming relevance of metaphors, artificial intelligence researcher 
Bipin Indurkhya (2007:10) comments that metaphors “should not be excluded from an 
account of rationality, because, otherwise, one would have to admit irrationality as a 
key ingredient of major areas of human thought and discourse”.  With this statement, 
Indurkhya threw down the proverbial gauntlet inviting a more detailed exploration of 
the relationship between metaphor and rationality, which this thesis attempts to pick up.  
 
1.1 AIMS AND OUTLINE OF THESIS 
The main claim of this thesis is that metaphors, under the conceptualist characterization 
as inference-preserving, cross-domain mappings, enable the fulfilment of a broadly 
defined set of rationality criteria that is not inherently scientific in outlook. By 
“science”, I mean a mode of inquiry applied to the production of knowledge verifiable 
by criteria such as confirmability, inter-subjective validity and falsifiability.  
Metaphorically structured knowledge and belief systems, rather than being 
definitionally ruled irrational (and thus undesirable), qualify to be interrogated under a 
more encompassing set of criteria, which in turn reveals the contributory role of 
metaphors for the systems’ negotiation of the criteria.    
In the next chapter, I review the literature on rationality, tracing the preeminence of 
rationality as a criterion of knowledge formation in the Enlightenment period and 
discussing its conflation with and subsequent decoupling from scientific inquiry.  
Drawing from work such as Elster (1983) and Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991), I 
suggest a set of four working criteria that is more accommodating of non-scientific 
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systems and therefore more helpful for the avoidance of polarized judgments based on a 
narrow scientific-nonscientific divide.   
In Chapter 3, I elaborate on the relationship between metaphor and the nature of human 
cognition, as well as the conceptual content of knowledge/belief systems.  If metaphor 
is indeed a ubiquitous mechanism of thought, then there should be no lack of empirical 
evidence for their deployment in the structuring of actual knowledge/beliefs.  I suggest 
a brief typology of metaphors in terms of their increasing relevance to the 
conceptualization and understanding of a knowledge/belief system, underscoring the 
point that the presence of metaphors is not claimed to be either necessary or sufficient 
for rationality.  Instead, in many cases, metaphors might be used merely to explain a 
system already deemed rational, whereas the more pertinent cases for us would be those 
systems that are constituted by (Boyd, 1993), and thus have their rationality largely 
dependent upon metaphors.  I then use a range of examples to illustrate how metaphors 
facilitate the fulfilment of each of the rationality criteria set up in Chapter 2.  
Chapters 4 and 5 attempt to contextualize the discussion of the relationship between 
metaphors and rationality by providing a case study of the Chinese divination system of 
Ba Zi (“eight characters”) – a body of knowledge most likely to be classified as 
irrational, from the scientific perspective of rationality.  Besides the fact that Ba Zi is a 
system which I show to be fundamentally metaphorical, thus making it a good source of 
data, the motivation behind this choice is that a positive diagnosis under our broader set 
of rationality criteria might hopefully generate more critical reflection regarding the 
prevailing categorical dismissal of such systems as straightforwardly irrational.  From a 
single case study we can inductively suggest that there exist many other 
knowledge/belief systems likewise metaphorically structured, which ought to be 
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evaluated not just under a revised set of rationality criteria, but probed for the operation 
of these facilitating metaphors as well. 
An issue raised in Chapter 4, and elaborated in Chapter 5, is that in some cases the 
absence of a clear conceptual resemblance, or homology, between a metaphorical 
source and target may give rise to perceptions of arbitrariness, which is detrimental for 
rationality judgments.  I therefore suggest that in investigating the role of metaphors in 
rational systems, the requirement for a homology between source and target strongly 
motivates source domain choice, and constitutes an additional criterion of rationality.  I 
argue that some historical understanding is required to establish such a homology 
between Ba Zi concepts that are today easily perceived as being metaphorically 
connected in an unmotivated way.  Given the likelihood that historical details tend to be 
overlooked by a contemporary audience more keen on understanding and applying Ba 
Zi to their own lives, I investigate some of the strategies employed by contemporary Ba 
Zi practitioners and writers to reestablish the lost homology without overt recourse to 
history.  This insight gleaned from the example of Ba Zi, viz., that source-target 
homology can be contingent upon prevailing socio-cultural practices and beliefs, serves 
as an important reminder that a thorough consideration of the success of metaphor in 
conferring rationality upon any particular system should not neglect the broader socio-
cultural context in which the system is situated.   
Chapter 6 adopts a more speculative tone in that I put forth some initial ideas about how 
future research can probe further into the relationship between metaphor and rationality.  
While the objective of this thesis is to explore how metaphors fulfil an independent set 
of criteria, length constraints make it impossible to speculate how these criteria might 
themselves be metaphorically structured - a hypothesis that leads to the more ambitious 
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claim that metaphor ontologically precedes and subsumes rationality.  In this chapter, I 
also make preliminary suggestions to analyze rationality via an approach favoured by 
many cognitive linguists/scholars, namely, to consider the category of “rational 
systems” as one that standardly exhibits prototype effects (Rosch 1973, Lakoff 1987), 
where systems such as science are viewed as prototypical under certain frames or 
“idealized cognitive models” (Lakoff, 1987) while divination systems like Ba Zi are 
less favourably perceived.  The final chapter then summarizes the entire work by 
reviewing the theoretical and ideological issues which first motivated this research, 
while offering some final comments on both relevant pre-existing as well as emergent 















 TOWARDS RATIONALITY CRITERIA 
2.0 A REVIEW OF VARIOUS CONCEPTIONS OF RATIONALITY 
Rationality, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “being based on or agreeable 
to reason”, gained preeminence as a distinctive criterion of knowledge formulation 
during the Enlightenment. Apart from the general quest to introduce systematic 
reasoning across social institutions then thought to be bound by the shackles of 
unquestioned traditional authority, philosophers such as Baruch Spinoza, David Hume 
and Immanuel Kant also sought a form of epistemic certainty which would guarantee 
the objective certainty of knowledge.  Isaac Newton’s claims about the universe being 
governed by inviolable physical laws that could be captured by the objective 
representations of mathematics instilled a profound sense of regularity and order which 
many of his contemporaries believed characterized all fields of knowledge (Gay, 1996).  
The notion of an inviolable order impervious to socio-historical manipulations gave 
birth to a crucial maxim of the scientific method - that hypotheses formed on the basis 
of new knowledge claims could be objectively tested within this impervious space, by 
the consistent and rigorous application of established methodologies.  This assumption 
lay behind the formulation of what came to be known as the hypothetico-deductive 
model of scientific inquiry:  
• Upon the observation of unexplained phenomena, conjecture a plausible causal 
explanation.   
• Next, devise experiments whose results would either affirm the conjectured 
explanation, or reject it based on a negative outcome.   
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In this model of scientific rationality, it was believed that new knowledge claims could 
be invariantly judged by the invariant application of strict scientific procedure.  
Knowledge was rational, credible and reliable if it abided by and passed this procedure; 
irrational, otherwise.  The “scientific method” could directly interrogate an 
uncontroversial, objectively existing world and the relations among entities in the world, 
independent of the internal perceptions and predilections of individuals, organizations 
or any other social categories that do not fit into this external world.  For human 
thought to be considered rational and “correct”, whatever units or categories of 
cognition that humans employed had to somehow mirror this immutable external reality 
either through directly referencing entities and relations between entities, or by 
symbolizing and manipulating them algorithmically.  Through the years, advances in 
the study of mind have explicated this notion via several metaphors, from the more 
traditional image of mind as a “mirror of nature” (Rorty, 1979) to the more recent 
construal of mind as an input-output device.  Almost invariably, though, successful 
cognition boiled down to the faithful representation of a pre-given world and its 
features, a conception which sidelines the potential role of cognizing agents themselves 
in bringing about this world.  A well-known example of the far-reaching influence of 
the paradigm of thought as algorithmic manipulation is Noam Chomsky’s formal 
conception of natural language (1957, 1965 etc.), where sentences were regarded as 
strings of formal symbols, language  as a set of such strings and grammar as rules for 
generating such sets.  
In the overarching context of the belief in an objectivist metaphysics, it is not surprising 
that a philosophical model devised to guide scientific inquiry dominated conceptions of 
the rationality of human thought.  Science, in its pursuit of gradually unveiling 
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knowledge about the objective world, became the paragon of rationality and rational 
thought. The interaction of science’s ability to observe facts about the physical world 
with the mind’s ability to formally manipulate these facts laid the foundations for 
logical positivism, or logical empiricism - a predominant movement which began in the 
1920s and grew out of discussions held by the “Vienna Circle”, a group of intellectuals 
including Hans Hahn, Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap (Achinstein and Barker, 1969).  
Though by no means an entirely coherent and unified movement, most logical 
positivists would agree that its most significant contribution was the doctrine of 
verificationism – in its strongest form, it stated that a proposition was only “cognitively 
meaningful” and rational if its truth or falsehood could be objectively demonstrated.  
Applied to scientific inquiry, it reinforced the attitude of positively affirming claims via 
sound experimentation.  Although later developments in scientific philosophy (e.g. 
Popper, 1972, 1984) suggested alternatives (e.g. falsifiability) to verificationism, these 
served only to further streamline the stringent criteria of rational knowledge and to 
perpetuate what was by then a deeply entrenched association between science and 
rationality. 
This entrenched association did not mean that inquiry into the nature and characteristics 
of rationality was confined solely to the domain of physical sciences.  Quite apart from 
its emphasis in the making of epistemic claims and the processes of knowledge 
formation, the concept of rationality has also been sociologically framed in 
consideration of its applicability to social phenomena.  As early as Plato, a “well-
ordered society” was believed to be one ruled by philosopher kings who devoted 
themselves to the study of rationality, delegating the “lower”, and by implication, less 
rational levels to politicians, military people and other workers.  This was an ideal 
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social structure, with the individual human body as its microcosmic counterpart – the 
soul was the site of pure rationality, overriding bodily desires (Dawes, 2001:32).  In his 
pivotal studies of the bureaucratization of Western society, Max Weber (1922) 
identified the phenomena of major social institutions such as economics and religion 
undergoing a shift from action and organization based upon traditional values to a mode 
of action and organization oriented towards the efficient achievement of tangible goals.  
He found that such shifts readily cohered with the rise of capitalism, traceable to the 
18th century in the Western world.   Rationality, in the broad sense of the 
standardization of procedure based on the establishment of a fixed method, had become 
a key feature not only of scientific pursuit, but sociopolitical governance as well.  
According to Weber, the accomplishment of “rational bureaucratic domination” in 
modern constitutional states, characterized mostly by the rise of individuals trained 
specifically to administer tasks in an objective, prescribed manner, has been visible 
across every organizational form of human activity.  Although his analysis stemmed 
from observations that were made primarily in the Western world, Weber has argued 
that the preeminence of rationality was indeed a universal phenomenon, with the 
Western example being a particular case shaped by specific Western trajectories of 
history.   
Weber suggests that despite the pervasive instantiation of “social rationality” in modern 
societies, it would be fallacious to think of rationality as an immutable, monolithic 
concept which has somehow become foregrounded in modern societies and 
unanimously transformed traditional modes of social practice and inquiry.   Instead, 
these instantiations are differently motivated, and very much shaped by particularistic 
socio-historical processes.  There is no absolute set of characteristics or values that 
13 
 
would objectively confer the status of “being rational”, because there are significant 
qualitative differences in the ways in which groups and societies came to regard 
themselves as rational2.  Rather, the process of rationalization is best understood as the 
consistent systemization of an individual/group’s behaviour and beliefs in order to 
conform to particular “ultimate values” held by different individuals/groups.  Such a 
fundamental perspectivism suggests that accusations of irrationality are not made based 
on transcendent criteria of rationality, but rather on an incompatibility of values.  In turn, 
the source of these axiomatic and irreducible commitments to group-specific values, 
which serve as a basis of justification for actions and beliefs, should be treated as 
products of socio-historical contingence.  From this point of view, there exists a 
plurality of “rationalities” operating upon a disparate range of social institutions and 
practices, of which science is but a part, with its own value-driven commitment to 
“conceive the world as a meaningful cosmos” (Kalberg, 1978:110).  Similarly, 
proponents of relativism and social constructivism3 have consistently frowned upon the 
monopolistic grip of science on knowledge, with some even arguing that scientific 
endeavour itself internally requires a relativistic outlook (Barnes and Bloor, 1982) by 
being more critically introspective of particular social, cultural or historical forces that 
might underlie its broad semblance of objectivity.   
Within the philosophy of science, such critical introspection has come most notably 
from Thomas Kuhn, who vigorously challenged the strict analytic view of objective 
rationality.  In his major work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Kuhn 
                                                           
2
 Weber’s typological analysis of the motivations of social actions yielded four principally distinct (but 
occasionally overlapping) categories – Affectual, Traditional, Value-rational and Instrumental-rational 
action, all of which have undergone consistent systematization. 
3
 Rationality and Relativism, edited by Martin Hollis and Stephen Lukes, provides an excellent summary 
of the subject matter at hand. 
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takes a historical perspective and argues that scientific theories and frameworks 
undergo periodic revolutions with the consequent emergence of rival and mutually 
unintelligible paradigms of inquiry.  He introduces the term “inter-paradigmatic 
incommensurability” to emphasize that not only is there no singular, objective scientific 
paradigm, but that rival paradigms are so fundamentally different that it is impossible to 
compare them and weigh their relative merits.  The particular nature of each paradigm 
concerns not only its major theoretical stances, but extends even to seemingly objective 
scientific data (i.e. observations about the world)4.   While logical positivism would 
maintain that theories can be objectively evaluated for their rightness or wrongness 
based on how their predictions fit empirical observations, Kuhn’s position strongly 
suggests that scientific truth is itself a paradigm-relative notion.  He essentially 
construes science as a relativistic, socio-historically contingent enterprise, leading some 
critics (see Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970) to accuse him of rejecting science as a 
rational mode of inquiry altogether. 
Paul Feyerabend (1978, 1999), another influential scholar of the philosophy of science, 
adopts a largely similar outlook in rejecting the existence of scientific methodologies 
that are universally abided by.  More recently, Susan Haack 5  (2003) has further 
contested the existence of a clear-cut “scientific method” by highlighting the differing 
background assumptions that guide these incommensurable paradigms.  In sum, a 
strong faith in the existence of an impervious, external reality comprised of entities and 
                                                           
4
 Kuhn gave the example of the concept of mass.  He argued that the different theoretical assumptions of 
Newtonian and Einsteinian physics necessarily lead to incompatible, theory-laden interpretations of even 
the most ostensibly objective scientific concepts such as mass. 
5
 Lest her viewpoint be misrepresented here, Haack has no intention to discredit science as a mode of 
inquiry.  She advocates a “middle path”, clearly acknowledging the efficacy of the scientific method but 
calling for a more critical examination of its background assumptions at the same time. 
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relations between entities greatly motivated a corresponding belief that rational thought 
must somehow be constituted by mechanisms that replicate this orderly state of affairs.  
However, with the introduction of a more relativistic perspective which questioned this 
faith in scientific objectivism, there was a sudden need for a much more thorough 
investigation into the nature of rational thought. 
A major breakthrough in this area came with the work of cognitive psychologist 
Eleanor Rosch and her associates (1973, 1976 etc.), whose studies on individuals’ 
judgments of seemingly straightforward category memberships of everyday objects 
strongly suggested the presence of “prototype effects” in the way humans create and 
conceptualize categories – a process deemed to be fundamental to cognition.  Under the 
objectivist view, the external world is comprised of ontologically discrete entities able 
to be characterized via necessary and sufficient conditions.  Since thought was 
supposed to mirror reality, our mental categories for the external world should also be 
definable along similar terms, with all members of a particular category fulfilling these 
necessary and sufficient conditions equally well.   
However, before the empirical work of Rosch et al, Wittgenstein (1953) had already 
realized the problems with this view through his celebrated example of the category of 
games”.  He observed that there appeared to be no common set of properties uniting the 
broad range of activities classifiable as games.  Instead, games are perceived as similar 
to one another in a multiplicity of ways, and no two games need share the exact same 
categorical properties.  Rosch et al affirmed such intuitions empirically, soliciting 
judgments about whether different species and variants of birds and furniture, etc. were 
perceived to be equal with regard to their status as category members.  Her results 
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revealed, for example, that robins and sparrows were viewed as the “best” examples (i.e. 
prototypical) of birds, with owls, eagles and penguins etc. progressively worse.   
Further work (see also Hunn 1975,1977, Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Johnson 1999) 
revealed that not only did individual categories demonstrate gradience in membership, 
but when analyzed in terms of taxonomic hierarchies from abstract to specific (e.g. 
“animal”  “dog”  “terrier”), members in the intermediate level were revealed to be 
the most psychologically and cognitively basic.  These are first to enter the lexicon of 
children, for instance, and are most rapidly identified due to a commonly perceived 
shape.  These asymmetries in category structures, where certain parts of a category 
appeared to be more cognitively salient than others, naturally posed a challenge to 
objectivist thought and rationality.  It seemed no longer adequate to consider a 
knowledge or belief system as rational if and only if there is a systematic and direct 
correspondence to objective truth, especially since work in relativistic philosophy of 
science suggests that there might be no such thing as the latter, and work in cognitive 
psychology refutes a model of rational thought that is simply mirrored upon any such 
objective truth. 
Therefore, in place of a strict objectivist conception of rationality, various strands of 
investigation spanning from the 1920s to the present day highlighted above converge to 
present an alternative.  A rational body of knowledge or beliefs need not be derived via 
the methods of science, which have themselves been shown to lack an overarching 
consistency across different paradigms.  The label of rationality, long since conflated 
with science, seems instead to refer to some ideal state of consistency that was once 
thought to be perfectly and exclusively attained by science.  Rationality of thought, on 
the other hand, would then broadly speaking concern the deployment of our range of 
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cognitive resources and conceptualization capacities to organize these bodies of 
knowledge or beliefs in a consistent manner.   
What is being suggested here is not an entirely relativistic conception of rationality, 
where individuals or communities are totally free to dictate what counts as rational, 
without some common conceptual criteria that holds across all systems and thereby 
upholds rationality as a meaningful notion in the first place.  An unconstrained Kuhnian 
conception of inter-paradigmatic incommensurability would lead to a multitudinous 
proliferation of “rationalities”, rendering the concept itself meaningless as a way of 
evaluating knowledge/belief systems.  Instead, communities can be deemed to 
rationally hold a non-contradictory, internally consistent set of knowledge/beliefs 
derived from fundamentally unchallengeable axioms (cf. Weber’s “ultimate values”).  
These axioms might take the form of ontological or epistemic assumptions that are 
irreducible and fundamentally unchallengeable, which may or may not hold 
correspondences with objective external reality6.  They might, for instance, be idealized 
notions of reality (in the case of political ideologies), be regarded as fictional (in the 
case of religious beliefs), or in some cases not even subscribe to the notion of truth (in 
the case of mathematical axioms). 
Having reviewed and rejected both the extreme ends of rationality-as-dictated-by-
scientific-objectivism and rationality-as-entirely-relativistic, we are now in a position to 
suggest a characterization of rationality that is more encompassing 7  without being 
                                                           
6
 It is naturally quite possible to argue that the requirement for a set of knowledge/beliefs to correspond to 
objective reality is itself an axiom of science.  
7
 By “encompassing” I am referring to the possibility for knowledge/belief systems besides science to be 
perceived as rational.  Though rationality clearly bears significance in a variety of other domains such as 
individual/social choices, actions and behavioural patterns, and possesses different connotations ranging 
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overly general to the point of meaninglessness.  The latter consideration calls for an 
essentially criterial approach which stipulates conditions that knowledge/belief systems 
need to fulfill in order to be considered rational, while the imperative to decouple 
science and rationality necessitates a fundamental willingness to consider non-scientific 
assumptions underlying knowledge/belief systems.  The next section attempts to 
suggest a set of four working rationality criteria which highlight the inherently non-
problematic nature of alternative values/epistemic assumptions and reaffirm conditions 
of rationality (e.g. internal consistency, logical validity) which are widely agreed upon 
(Elster 1983; Johnson-Laird and Byrne 1991 etc).  Formal consistency, however, does 
not amount to rationality since it involves only logical relationships between the 
elements of a system without considering their actual conceptual content.  A system of 
meaningless symbols with a list of consistent rules prescribing their combination might 
not be properly thought of as rational, if there is no discernable purpose or function 
behind such an activity.  In other words, rationality connotes substantive 
meaningfulness, which in turn requires that knowledge/belief sets be productively 
expandable upon new and relevant evidence.  This intrinsic sensitivity to or non-
immunity from evidence, which also suggests the necessity of knowers/believers to be 
sensitive as such, is likewise captured in the working criteria.  
While each of the following criteria (see Section 2.1) is either widely agreed to be 
(criteria B, C, D) or definitionally stipulated to be (criterion A) necessary conditions for 
rationality, I am unprepared to confidently assert that they are collectively sufficient, 
not least because verifying this claim would technically require a survey of every 
                                                                                                                                                                           
from “efficiency” to “self-determination” (Elster, 1983:1), this dissertation is primarily interested in and 
limited to the first instance.   
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possible knowledge/belief system.  An appeal to a form of “pragmatic sufficiency”, 
however, should not be too unreasonable, in the sense that an example of a system 
which fulfils all the criteria but is yet deemed to be irrational fails to come to mind even 
after some contemplation.  Were such a system to be discovered, the reason for its 
perceived irrationality would of course make a welcome addition to my criteria list. 
 
2.1 WORKING CRITERIA OF RATIONALITY 
In sum, this set of criteria emphasizes the non-problematic nature of alternative 
epistemic assumptions, widely-accepted requirements of internal consistency and 
validity, as well as the manner in which knowledge/beliefs should be rationally held.  
The motivation behind postulating these and only these criteria has already been alluded 
to in the previous section.  Given their fundamental role in logical thinking, the criteria 
of internal consistency and of validity (B and C respectively) are able to interrogate, 
without distinction, systems from different domains of inquiry which might subscribe to 
differing epistemic assumptions.  Criterion A is motivated by the need to preserve a 
ground of immunity for systems to subscribe to their respective epistemic assumptions,  
while Criterion D  ensures that such immunity does not extend to situations where new 
evidence arise.  Though more or less intuitive, A and D have thus far evaded explicit 
mention.  The collective sufficiency of these four criteria is, to reiterate, a matter of 
pragmatic acceptance on the grounds that systems which pass all criteria but are yet 






A body of knowledge/beliefs should be demonstrable as subscribing to some 
fundamental set of values and/or epistemic assumptions, which cannot be invalidated by 
the methods of rival systems. 
Criterion A is particularly overlooked in situations where hasty accusations of 
irrationality are made by a system that really has no objective (i.e. undisputed, 
consensual) method to critically interrogate the accused system, or when a system 
imposes its values and assumptions on another.  If the accused system can demonstrate 
that its own assumptions cannot be invalidated by those of another system, it cannot 
then be dismissed as irrational on that account.   
It should be noted that holding assumptions which “cannot be invalidated” seems to 
make criterion A look like a criterion of irrationality, from the Popperian perspective of 
science.  Committed to the present attempt to decouple rationality and scientificity, 
however, the natural perspective to take here would be to regard Popperian falsifiability 
as being an epistemic assumption of science itself.  Hence, Popperian falsifiability 
extends only to the falsification of scientific claims, via scientific methods.  Pertinently, 
as mentioned earlier, the very requirement of knowledge/beliefs cohering with objective 
truth can be viewed as particular to science.   
There are clearly many assumptions held by non-scientific systems that are neither 
scientifically verifiable nor falsifiable (e.g. existence of a god), and to dismiss all of 
them as irrational on the basis of scientific falsifiability would defeat the present 
purpose of decoupling rationality from science.  Admittedly, modern science with its 
ideological currency often succeeds in pressurizing these systems to demonstrate their 
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rationality using scientific criteria. Via criterion A, the task for any knowledge/belief 
system claiming to be rational would then precisely be to demonstrate that its 
fundamental assumptions cannot be invalidated by science, or any other system for that 
matter.  If the assumptions can indeed be externally invalidated, then the system in 
question cannot easily escape from accusations of irrationality made by the rival system. 
One example comes from a particular interpretation of the Falun Gong, where there is a 
fundamental belief in the existence of a “wheel of law” in the stomachs of believers8.  
The emphasis on the literal existence of a physical object located in a part of the human 
anatomy naturally invites scientific validation.  The belief can easily be shown to be 
false (i.e. not corresponding to objective reality) and hence scientifically irrational – the 
most straightforward of methods being an X-ray photograph9.   
Although criterion A suggests that all knowledge/belief systems should ideally lie upon 
a set of axiomatic assumptions that are only internally justifiable, the remaining criteria, 
which are more objectively demonstrable, should clarify the potential misunderstanding 
that what is being propagated here is an entirely relativistic account of rationality.  
Imaginably, a large proportion of accusations regarding the irrationality of systems 
concern criterion A.  The difficulty of providing objective rationale either for or against 
fundamental assumptions is often the cause of breakdown in communication between 
systems.  The repeated failure of attempts to fully reconcile religious and scientific 
claims (but see Polkinghorne, 2000) is a case in point. 
                                                           
8
 Information obtained from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/401268.stm .  Last accessed 26th April 
2008. 
9
 An even more undisputed method might be a surgical incision of the abdomen, a maneuver that one 
hapless follower was reported to have performed on himself, with death as a consequence. (From 




A body of knowledge/beliefs must be internally consistent; i.e. no two elements of the 
system should contradict each other. 
This is perhaps the most basic and widely agreed upon criterion of rationality.  Ideally, 
the non-contradiction is demonstrable by formal means.  The knowledge/beliefs should 
be translatable into propositions that, taken together, do not result (for example) in 
situations where both p and ~p hold, or more subtly, where p, q, and p  ~q all hold.  
Patients suffering from Cotard’s syndrome, which includes holding an unwavering 
belief that they are dead, are by this criterion irrational if they simultaneously believe 
that dead people such as themselves continue to eat, talk and breathe, while others 
around them who consistently exhibit such behaviour are not dead.   
An individual may subscribe to more than one internally consistent system, where 
beliefs from one system contradict that of another.  Though such cross-system 
contradictions do not necessarily jeopardize the rationality of either system, it is 
interesting to question whether the individual is behaving rationally since her 
subscription to contradictory systems implies a lack of internal consistency at the level 
of her overall beliefs.  This underscores the importance of teasing apart the rationality 
of knowledge/beliefs per se, and the way in which these are held; a point already 
mentioned, and given further elaboration in Criterion D.  
Criterion C 
Claims and conclusions drawn on the basis of the knowledge/beliefs must demonstrably 
follow from them in a way deemed reasonably valid by relevant rules of inference (e.g. 
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both feasible and defeasible reasoning – modus ponens, modus tollens, abductive, 
probabilistic, inductive reasoning etc). 
This criterion concerns the extension of existing knowledge/beliefs to new ones, 
especially for relatively productive systems such as science.  It introduces an objective, 
“universal” element to the set of criteria, given that there is a satisfactory and broad 
consensus regarding the logical validity of rules of inference such as those listed above 
(for an excellent summary of these rules, refer to Mohanan, Mohanan and Abraham 
2004).  
Some might argue that inferences drawn from knowledge/beliefs must not only be valid, 
but that rationality further requires that all possible inferences be considered, and all 
valid ones accepted (e.g. Hintikka, 1962).  However, as Cherniak (1986) points out, 
knowledge/belief systems might in principle be too large for our finite cognitive 
capacities to generate all possible inferences.  Moreover, “an inference may be sound, 
but it may not be reasonable to make it, because it is of no foreseeable value at the time 
and prevents the agent from using his limited cognitive resources to do other things that 
are obviously valuable at the time” (Cherniak, 1986:24).   An individual who knows 
that “if I drink the water, I will get sick” and inadvertently drinks the water should 
obviously act upon that inference instead of ruminating on other possible inferences.  
Cherniak labels this “minimal normative rationality” (1986:23) and considers it 
sufficient for all intents and purposes.  The existence of such “rationality horizons” can 
be seen as another retort to the traditional assumptions of a disinterested, objectivist 




Criterion D  
The knower/believer must be constantly willing to consider new evidence deemed 
relevant and admissible to the knowledge/beliefs, and alter them if necessary. 
Criterion D stipulates that no rational system should immunize itself from potential new 
evidence that warrants a revision to the system.  Such a revision could potentially 
extend to the axioms or assumptions that underlie the system itself (mentioned in ‘A’).  
A good example of this criterion in action is again the domain of the sciences, where 
periodic revolutions revise not just the content of scientific beliefs, but the assumptions 
that sanction them.  The shift from classical to relativistic physics, for instance, hinged 
upon observations that did not cohere with the assumed model of the physical universe. 
In some situations, individuals may not only fail to register new and relevant evidence, 
but may refuse to consider existing evidence relevant to the knowledge or belief as well.  
A good example is children’s classic belief of the monster hiding beneath their beds, 
waiting to devour them at night.  Despite a plethora of relevant evidence demonstrating 
its falsehood (e.g. failure via any of the senses to detect the monster; night after night 
where no monster shows up), the belief may be immunized via the introduction of other 
claims (e.g. the monster has powers to avoid detection; it strikes when one is least on 
guard).  Similar and not uncommon cases occur amongst adults too – invisible stalkers, 
family members plotting to take one’s life, etc.   Although the set of beliefs that 
characterize these ostensibly delusional cases may very well be non-contradictory, they 
can hardly be considered rational if relevant evidence clearly points towards their 
implausibility, if not outright falsehood. 
25 
 
However, in similar vein to Cherniak, an interesting “rationality horizon”-type defence 
has been suggested for the apparent irrationality involved in rejecting admissible 
evidence.  In The Modularity of Mind (1983), philosopher and psychologist Jerry Fodor 
discusses the famous Müller-Lyer optical illusion (Figure 2.1) and argues that even 
when we know both lines are equal in length, the bottom line is still intuitively 
perceived as longer.  Similarly, an individual with a phobia of snakes is unlikely to dare 
to touch a cobra even if she is reassured that its poison glands have been removed.     
Quite apart from an obstinate refusal to consider objective evidence, Fodor claims in 
accordance with his modularity-of-mind thesis that information about the equal length 
of lines or the harmlessness of snakes is cognitively inaccessible to a separate part of 
the mind that produces visual perception and fear respectively.  From this point of view, 
apparent irrationality in such situations seems to be an inherent cognitive constraint.  A 
consideration of these cases motivates the wording of criterion D as “the 
knower/believer must be constantly willing to consider new evidence”, leaving out 
instances where they are presumably unable to do so.   
 
Figure 2.1 The Müller-Lyer illusion 
Since it is mostly up to the individual to admit or reject new evidence, this criterion 
pertains more to the manner in which knowledge or beliefs are held, than to the 
knowledge/beliefs themselves.  A detailed discussion of the rationality behind specific 
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processes of weighing new evidence and arriving at a conclusion over whether existing 
knowledge/beliefs are to be abandoned or revised is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
the general import of this criterion is clear – knowledge and beliefs should generally not 
be held – or conceptualized – as being impervious to change.   
 
2.2  CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have offered a review of various key conceptions of rationality, 
emphasizing the absence of an inherent and exclusive relationship between rationality 
and science.  To embody this broader perspective I have suggested a set of criteria 
which accommodate alternative epistemic assumptions while preserving widely agreed 
upon conditions such as internal consistency (c.f. Elster 1983, Holland 2006).  It should 
also be noted that the suggested criteria presents rationality as a characteristic not only 
of knowledge/beliefs (criteria A-C), but of the knower/believer as well (criterion D). 
In the next chapter, I argue that conceptual metaphors, which have been claimed to play 
a fundamental role in human cognition (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999) as well as the 
systemization of complex bodies of knowledge (e.g. mathematics; Lakoff and Nunez 
2000),   provide a natural link between the way individuals hold their knowledge/beliefs 
(cognition) and the knowledge/beliefs themselves.  The broad ambit of rationality 
which includes both characteristics of the knower and the knowledge could find a 
plausible interface in the phenomenon of conceptual metaphor.  Chapter 3 explores one 
aspect of that interface – how conceptual metaphors present in knowledge/belief 
systems can function as an important resource to facilitate the fulfilment of the broader 





CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR AND RATIONALITY 
3.0  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN METAPHOR AND COGNITION 
An examination of the etymology of “metaphor” reveals that it comes from the Greek 
word metaphora, meaning “transfer”.  Metaphors have traditionally been recognized as 
a rhetorical trope through which attributes of a particular entity known as the “vehicle” 
are ascribed to, or transferred to another entity known as the “tenor” (I. A. Richards, 
1936).  Metaphor as a figure of speech was primarily linguistic in nature, and regarded 
as most salient in the domain of literary creation, where dramatic resemblances between 
seemingly unrelated entities are created for stylistic effect.  For this reason the 
employment of metaphors was primarily considered by most as fanciful flights of the 
imagination.  The apparently whimsical activity of recasting properties of objects based 
on unconstrained perceptions of similarity meant that metaphors seemed to have little 
regard for notions such as objectivity and truth conditions, which were crucial for 
objectivist conceptions of truth and rationality.   Furthermore, the idea of “transferring” 
knowledge from one entity to another for the purposes of conceptualizing the latter 
appeared to be a very strange one for objectivist rationality, which posited that units of 
thought were symbols that directly represented an objectively existing world, and that 
further cognitive operations were achieved by algorithmic manipulation of these 
symbols.   
Research on metaphor, however, has undergone a veritable proliferation in recent 
decades, most significantly in the field of cognitive linguistics, a relatively new branch 
of linguistic theory that situates its assumptions within the larger field of cognitive 
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science.  The so-called “cognitive revolution” (Gardner, 1985) beginning in the mid-
1970s took the form of a series of empirical studies that aimed to challenge 
predominant objectivist conceptions of cognition and reality, which were thought to be 
a priori speculative assumptions motivated by the legacies of Cartesian and analytic 
philosophy (for a detailed discussion, see Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991, Lakoff 
and Johnson 1999).   The main tenets of the latter include those discussed in Chapter 2; 
e.g. thought as symbolic manipulation, as well as a cluster of related assumptions such 
as the disembodied nature of mind, the categorization of concepts via necessary and 
sufficient conditions, and the literal (i.e. non-metaphorical) nature of meaning.  To 
replace these tenets, champions of the cognitive revolution proposed theories of 
cognition as embodied and predicated upon the human neurobiological makeup (e.g. 
Rosch (1973) on categorization; Kay and MacDaniel (1978) on colour perception; 
Johnson (1989) on image-schematic structures; Narayanan (1997) on neurological 
representations of embodied cognition etc).   
The proliferation of metaphor research was guided by these new theories of cognition, 
resulting in the birth of the influential “contemporary theory of metaphor (CMT 
hereafter)” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1993).  Metaphor was transformed from 
being understood as isolated instances of fanciful language to a pervasive phenomenon 
in cognition.  Metaphorical expressions are now deemed to be surface linguistic 
instantiations of an underlying structure of “cross-domain mappings” between separate 
domains of knowledge.  CMT’s crucial point of alignment with embodied cognition is 
that inherently non-embodied and experientially unfamiliar “target domain” concepts 
are hypothesized to be always conceptualized via mappings from a “source domain” 
that is experientially more concrete or familiar.  “Experience” in this case refers to 
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sensorimotor and bodily experiences that we as humans inevitably accrue through our 
routine functioning in the world.  Cross-domain metaphorical reasoning is not only 
cognitively motivated, Lakoff and Johnson (1999:58) argue, but a matter of necessity, 
since the non-metaphorical structure of a large number of seemingly mundane, 
everyday concepts  such as temporality and causation “are relatively impoverished and 
have only a minimal, skeletal structure”.   For example, time is in many languages 
typically construed in spatial terms, while causes are construed as physical forces. Other 
than linguistic representation, inferential structures of source domains are mapped onto 
target domains in order to successfully reason about the latter.  Quite contrary to the 
objectivist belief in literal and direct conceptualization, CMT argues not only for the 
relevance of metaphor to cognition, but its paramount importance as well.  
A small sample of linguistic evidence for some other salient metaphorical mappings 
that reveal the abstract-via-concrete mechanism includes expressions like “She whets 
my appetite”, “I cannot wait to taste victory” (conceptualizing desire in terms of hunger) 
and “I feel close to him”, “We’re drifting further and further apart” (conceptualizing 
emotional proximity in terms of physical proximity).  To further demonstrate the 
conceptual link between embodied experiences and abstract concepts, Christopher 
Johnson (1997) and Joe Grady (1997) hypothesize that early childhood experiences 
typically result in an undistinguished conflation of the two.  Returning to the examples 
above, there is likely to be a constant co-occurrence of the subjective feeling of desire 
with the bodily experience of hunger during human infancy, or the feeling of emotional 
closeness when being physically held close.  Although humans eventually learn to 
differentiate subjective experiences from their counterpart bodily experiences, 
entrenched “cross-domain associations” nonetheless persist beyond childhood, resulting 
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in the formation of what Grady calls “primary metaphors”, which in turn comprise the 
basic building blocks of more abstract and schematic sets of cross-domain mappings.  
LIFE IS A JOURNEY10 (Lakoff and Johnson 1999), for example, can be decomposed 
into primary metaphors such as PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, ACTIONS ARE 
MOTIONS etc.  
The hypothesis of primary metaphors, with its emphasis on a uniform set of embodied 
experiences insensitive to cultural differences, is an example of the commitment of 
CMT to the claim that conceptual metaphors are a universal phenomenon; a deep-seated 
mechanism of human cognition, and “one of the greatest of our intellectual gifts” 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999:129).   Although there has been much contestation regarding 
the primacy of metaphor over other mechanisms for understanding the world, most 
notably from cognitive anthropology (see D’Andrade 1990, Quinn 1991), there is now a 
reasonable degree of consensus that metaphor does play an important role in reasoning 
and thought.  This makes it necessary to give serious consideration to metaphor when 
dealing with the organization of knowledge and beliefs.   
 
3.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN METAPHOR AND 
KNOWLEDGE/BELIEF SYSTEMS 
If the comprehension and elaboration of abstract concepts that have “impoverished 
literal structures” are indeed wrought by way of metaphor, there should be no lack of 
empirical evidence for their presence in established knowledge/belief systems.  Much 
research has indeed been conducted on the presence and function of metaphors in a 
variety of knowledge/belief systems, and while there is relatively little disagreement 
                                                           
10
 Following cognitive linguistic conventions, metaphors are denoted in the form A IS B, where A = 
target domain and B = source domain. 
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regarding the role of metaphor as a mechanism of cognition, the actual degree of 
dependence of our knowledge/belief systems on metaphor is a widely disputed matter 
that has invited a range of opinions and research outcomes.  While the role of 
metaphors in certain systems has been shown to be merely expository in nature, 
confined to facilitating understanding by providing systematic analogies with a more 
familiar knowledge structure, other systems appear to rely on metaphor in a far more 
constitutive sense.  Richard Boyd (1993) suggests that the varying degrees of a 
knowledge/belief system’s reliance on metaphors can be clearly seen in the diachronic 
process of scientific theory development, where younger theories and models often rely 
closely on metaphors for exploring new and potentially insightful inferences, while 
more mature theories employ metaphors more for expository purposes.  
Taking into account divergent views on this matter, we can group the varying 
relationships between metaphor and knowledge/belief systems into three broad 
categories: Expository/Explanatory, Underlying and Constitutive, as outlined in the 
following subsections. These categories describe an increasing degree of relevance and 
application of metaphor to the understanding of systems.   
 
3.1.1 EXPOSITORY/EXPLANATORY METAPHORS 
There are cases where knowledge/belief systems overtly employ metaphors for the 
purpose of illuminating particular concepts that are not themselves thought of as 
metaphorical.  These metaphors are often deployed in an analogical fashion, 
capitalizing on perceived structural similarities between source and target in order to 
explicate the more abstract and experientially unfamiliar target in terms of the more 
concrete and experientially familiar source.  Examples include the typical classroom 
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depiction of atoms as miniature solar systems, where systematic correspondences are 
established between counterparts in both domains (e.g. nucleus as sun, electrons as 
planets), or the standard “ball and rubber sheet” analogy in special relativity (e.g. space-
time curvature as the depression of the sheet under the ball’s weight).  As Boyd 
(1993:486) puts it, such metaphors “do not convey theoretical insights”, but are likely 
useful to the extent that structural similarities exist between the target and source in 
order to aid explanation or pedagogy (see also Wee, 2005 for another list of examples).  
As such, they appear to be a facilitary phenomenon that is at best ancillary to the nature 
of the knowledge/belief system at hand.   For our present purpose, such metaphors seem 
unlikely to be crucial for the rationality of the target system in question, since they do 
not figure centrally in the primary processes of their conceptualization11.  It can be said 
that these metaphors demonstrate, rather than constitute, the well-formedness of the 
respective systems. 
 
3.1.2 UNDERLYING METAPHORS 
Although metaphors may sometimes be used consciously and overtly to provide 
simplifying analogies, allowing us to maintain an objective distinction between the 
metaphors and the system which employs them, more intriguing claims have been made 
which attempt to hold metaphor directly responsible for the conceptualization (and by 
implication, rationality) of knowledge/belief systems.  As discussed above, CMT and 
the Lakoffian paradigm mostly conceive of the relationship between metaphor and 
knowledge/belief systems in this way.  Pursuing his initial claims from Metaphors We 
                                                           
11
 However, it is possible that what appears as an expository metaphor today might have once played a 
more significant role in the initial stages of a system’s development, where the exploration of different 
metaphorical inferences was important for generating new insights (Refer to section 3.1.3). 
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Live By and Philosophy in the Flesh, Lakoff together with Rafael Nunez (2000) 
attempts to demonstrate how mathematical concepts – a long-time bastion of objectivist 
rationality – possess an underlying structure of conceptual metaphors that have their 
sources grounded in various aspects of embodied experience.  For instance, Lakoff and 
Nunez claim that the notion of infinity, highly abstract and without any conceivable 
experiential basis, is nonetheless conceptualized in terms of a series of finite iterations, 
as instantiated by the idea of limits in calculus.  They offer parallel examples from the 
aspectual system in English, where an intended conceptualization of an infinite 
continuative is achieved by morpho-syntactic markings characteristic of iteratives, such 
as conjunctions.  In a sentence like “John jumped and jumped and jumped” (2000:156), 
conjoining an inherently perfective verb invites the interpretation that the action repeats 
indefinitely. Besides infinity, Lakoff and Nunez also attempt to uncover the 
metaphorical structure of trigonometry, transfinite numbers and several other abstract 
mathematical systems.  Extending this approach to systems far removed from the 
western intellectual tradition, work has also been done in uncovering the so-called 
underlying metaphors in Confucianism and Buddhism (Slingerland 2003, 2004; Lu and 
Chiang 2007; Tay 2007).  The inseparability of systems and their underlying metaphors 
asserted by such analyses underscores the close relationship between metaphor and 
rationality. 
 
3.1.3 CONSTITUTIVE METAPHORS 
There is, however, yet another level in the relationship between metaphors and 
knowledge/belief systems, brought about by what Boyd (1993) calls “theory-
constitutive metaphors”. The distinction between constitutive and underlying metaphors 
lies in the fact that while knowledge/belief systems containing underlying metaphors 
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might possess means of surface expression  that are not obviously metaphorical (e.g. 
mathematical symbols), there exist some systems where “metaphorical expressions 
constitute, at least for a while, an irreplaceable part of (their) linguistic machinery” 
(1993:486).  Boyd’s main argument is that relatively young sciences that have yet to 
develop sufficiently complex and independent theoretical structures do not merely use 
metaphors to analogically explain what is already well understood, but might rely on 
these analogies to explore similarities and generate new insights.  In other words, the 
employment of these metaphors is hardly motivated by a perception of pre-existing 
similarities, but by the need to find particularly suitable source domains from which 
new insights via metaphorical inferences can hopefully be gained, in order to advance 
the presently inadequate understanding of the target system.  Presumably, after the 
target system has developed adequately, the constitutive character of these metaphors 
becomes less pronounced, as the target develops its own “linguistic machinery”. Boyd 
offers the example of cognitive psychology, a relatively young field in the 1970s, and 
the central role of the brain-as-computer metaphor for its theorizing processes.  Al-
Zahrani (2008) makes a similar case for the Darwinian metaphor of evolution-as-
progress. To put it in straightforward terms, there can be no cognitive psychology or 
evolutionary theory without either the metaphors that constitute them, or the cognitive 
mechanism of drawing new metaphorical inferences that allow the theory to develop.   
It should be clear by now that there is a significant facilitating relationship between 
metaphor and rationality, and this can be expected to be most apparent in systems 
where metaphors take on a constitutive character.  The rationality criteria spelt out in 
Chapter 2 interrogate a knowledge/belief system, as well as the attitudinal stance of the 
knower/believer, on grounds such as internal consistency and the integrity of epistemic 
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assumptions involved.  In the ostensible absence of an independent and ‘literal’ 
conceptual structure upon which these criteria can be applied, whether or not a system 
in which metaphors are constitutive can be deemed as rational would then depend 
largely on how felicitous these metaphors are with regard to the criteria.  I shall next 
provide a general sketch of how metaphors can be involved in the fulfilment of my 
criteria, which naturally advances the claim that systems that are irreducibly 
metaphorical stand in good stead to acquire a semblance of rationality by that fact.  This 
general sketch will be contextualized via a case study in the following chapter, where I 
argue for the presence of such a semblance in Ba Zi – a system popularly regarded as 
irrational, which I will show to be irreducibly metaphorical.   
 
3.2 HOW METAPHORS FULFIL RATIONALITY CRITERIA 
This section recalls Criteria A-D from the previous chapter and discusses the relevance 
of metaphors for each.  As the discussion proceeds along each criterion, examples will 
be provided from a variety of systems to illustrate the role played by metaphors, 
especially in the context of theory development and change - where the question of a 
theory’s rationality is often highlighted.   
It should be clarified right from the start that I am not arguing for the necessity of 
metaphors for the rationality of any system, but rather their availability as a resource for 
the fulfillment of my set of working criteria.  There is therefore no reason to expect any 
system to utilize metaphor as a means of fulfilling all the criteria, since that would be 
tantamount to claiming that rationality itself proceeds by way of metaphor.  This would 




Recalling Criterion A, 
A body of knowledge/beliefs should be demonstrable as subscribing to some 
fundamental set of values and/or epistemic assumptions, which cannot be invalidated by 
the methods of rival systems. 
In Chapter 2, I argued that a set of epistemic assumptions cannot be dismissed as 
irrational if the methods of a rival system cannot show it to be invalid.  Attainment of 
this criterion naturally presupposes the existence of a well-formed set of assumptions in 
the first place, which as we have seen could be problematic for systems and theories 
still in their formative stages.  Reverting to the example of early cognitive psychology, 
a reliance on both the “linguistic machinery” and knowledge structure of the computing 
domain in order to inferentially discover the basic tenets of cognitive psychology 
essentially amounts to a metaphorical appropriation of the basic assumptions governing 
the former.  For example, the basic assumption that computing functions are entirely an 
outcome of pre-determined and pre-programmed instructions leads, via a commitment 
to the constitutive mind-as-computer metaphor, to a corresponding speculation about 
whether or not certain cognitive processes are likewise “pre-programmed” – or innate.  
Presumably, cognitive psychology theorists felt reasonably secure about metaphorically 
deriving a potential new tenet not only because of the strong inference-preserving 
characteristic of the metaphor itself, but also because of the general respectability and 
well-formedness of the source domain.  In such cases metaphors can be seen as 
“ontology-changing devices” (Indurkhya, 2007) that enable the epistemic assumptions 
of a system to be parasitic upon those of another.  Any attempt to question or invalidate 
these assumptions then invariably becomes an attempt to either challenge the more 
mature set of assumptions, or to challenge the viability of the metaphor itself. 
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A similar situation can be gleaned from the pervasive tendency in many cultures to 
rationalize the concept of love through a formidable variety of metaphorical construals, 
particularly that of LOVE IS A JOURNEY (Lakoff and Johnson 1999).    Fairly common 
idioms along the lines of “love is blind”, “love is unconditional” and “hell hath no fury 
like a woman scorned” seem to reveal a widespread folk belief, at least in contemporary 
western culture, that “love” and its attendant notions are characterized by irrational 
passion. Therefore, attempting to pin down a coherent set of “assumptions” governing 
the concept of love is likely to be futile.  However, if Lakoff and Johnson are right 
about the love-as-journey metaphor being ultimately reducible to correspondences 
between subjective judgments and embodied experiences, it becomes clear how the by-
and-large reliable and uncontroversial sensorimotor inferences can be mapped from the 
embodied source domains to engage in some form of rational discussion about love.  
Imagine a hypothetical scenario, where a man disgruntled with his marriage and 
contemplating divorce is being counselled by a friend.  It is perfectly reasonable to 
suppose that the friend might say something like “Marriage is a promise to accompany 
each other till the end of life’s journey.  Overcoming obstacles along the way is tough, 
but it will be easier to do it with someone else by your side”.  Again, basic knowledge 
and assumption about journey-making, which are likely to be uncontroversially shared 
by the friend, are mapped onto the domain of love in which such uncontroversial 
assumptions are few and far between.  Love appears to be far more rational when 
couched in journey-terms, and when this is done the aforementioned popular idioms 
which profile its irrationality suddenly lose their applicability.   
Criterion B states that a body of knowledge/beliefs must be internally consistent; i.e. no 
two elements of the system should contradict each other. If we view metaphors as 
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systematic, inference-preserving correspondences from source to target, where both 
entities and relations between entities are faithfully mapped, then an internally 
consistent source domain would by definition guarantee an internally consistent target.  
Again, this is most explicit for systems that rely on constitutive metaphors where 
maximal correspondence is required for the well-formedness of the target system.  
While relying on the internal consistency of source domains might be a salient feature 
for systems that do not independently possess that characteristic, it becomes highly 
interesting to question whether metaphors figure in systems that are already widely 
accepted as passing criterion B.  Taking a page out of Richard Boyd’s (1993) already 
mentioned historical perspective of scientific theory change, we might hypothesize that 
systems that are judged to pass criterion B without overt recourse to metaphor are likely 
to have, at some point prior to the development of an independent linguistic machinery, 
depended on constitutive metaphors as well. The answer we get from Boyd is therefore 
one that introduces time into the equation – knowledge/belief systems tend to start off 
with a high degree of reliance on metaphors, but gradually shed that reliance once they 
acquire, among other characteristics, internal consistency in their own right.   
We might think of mathematics as one such system.  After all, many of its various 
branches have undergone substantial periods of development (Kline, 1990), and the 
essentially axiomatic character of these various branches is highly indicative of their 
internal consistency. Thus there appears to be no reason to suppose that metaphors 
contribute to the internal consistency of mathematics. However, as Lakoff and Nunez 
(2000) have claimed, there actually exist entire structures of conceptual metaphors 
underlying the apparently non-metaphorical surface of mathematical consistency.  They 
further argue that metaphors are directly responsible for the conceptualization of 
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various mathematical concepts, and would likely agree with the suggestion that 
mathematics would not be an internally consistent enterprise without these underlying 
metaphors.   The example of infinity has already been sketched in section 3.1.2.   
It then appears that metaphors can contribute towards the internal consistency of 
knowledge/belief systems both overtly and subtly – as we have seen from examples of 
their constitutive and underlying character, respectively.        
Moving on to criterion C, 
Claims and conclusions drawn on the basis of the knowledge/beliefs must demonstrably 
follow from them in a way deemed reasonably valid by relevant rules of inference 
(deductive modus ponens, modus tollens, abductive, probabilistic, inductive reasoning 
etc). 
This criterion can be seen as closely related to the previous criterion of internal 
consistency, since it would be virtually impossible to validly extend a set of 
knowledge/beliefs that contradict each other.  The process of valid extension can be 
thought of as an application of independent rules of inference to an existing set of 
knowledge/beliefs, in order to rationally expand the set.    While metaphors can directly 
contribute to the organization of the existing set to bring about internal consistency, it is 
far less obvious how they are relevant to these independent rules of inference, much 
less affect them qualitatively in any way.  Rules of inference are widely understood to 
be highly schematic and independent of the actual semantic content of the 
knowledge/beliefs they act upon (Mohanan, Mohanan and Abraham 2004), such that 
given All X are Y and Z is X, we have no difficulty inferring correctly that Z is Y even 
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though X, Y and Z might be unfamiliar or entirely fictional entities or categories12.  
Therefore, metaphorical construals of knowledge/beliefs appear to have no direct 
bearing on the integrity of reasoning processes than bring about the fulfillment of 
criterion C13.  In other words, metaphorically conceptualizing a target system cannot 
prevent fallacious reasoning per se, since there is every possibility that logical fallacies 
continue to be committed even when reasoning via the source domain.   
However, though it is technically possible for invalid reasoning to plague the source 
domain, the fact that most source domains are experientially more concrete or familiar 
than the target suggests that this is much less likely to happen, and that applying valid 
rules of inference to gather new insights becomes an easier enterprise when reasoning 
via the source rather than the often nebulous target.  This relative ease of 
knowledge/belief extension afforded by employing metaphor has been shown to have 
tangible effects, particularly in the domains of education (Petrie and Oshlag 1993) and 
social policy (Schön 1993). 
In education, a significant amount of research has converged upon agreement that 
metaphors are invaluable resources for the imparting of unfamiliar or complex concepts 
(Biermann, 1988; DiGiovanna 1987; Zegers, 1983).  Source domains are shown to 
typically draw from familiar aspects of students’ lives such as social relationships, 
school, money and sports – domains from which they would have little difficulty 
                                                           
12
 This is of course also true for non-deductive modes of reasoning. Given that all X’s encountered thus 
far are Y, and that Z is an X, we likewise inductively conclude that Z is likely to be Y.   
13
 However, as briefly sketched by Lakoff (1987) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999), there are plausible 
grounds to suggest that conventional modes of inference are themselves structured by metaphor – a claim 
that would accord a far more profound role to metaphors in the rationality of systems than this 
dissertation is prepared to undertake.  Nonetheless, as already mentioned, a brief outline of this 
possibility is sketched in chapter 6 as an invitation for further research.  
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making valid inferences.  Sometimes, the source domain might not directly resonate 
with students’ experiences, but nonetheless allows for students to directly represent it 
through physical participation (Ball, 1987). The kinetic particle theory from physics is a 
good example, where students can role-play as particles with varying characteristics 
across different matter states. 
Parallel examples from social policy are highlighted by Schön (1993) as he discusses 
how American housing policy makers in the 1950s and 60s selectively imposed 
metaphorical “frames” in order to construct a coherent set of problems out of the 
overwhelmingly complex and indeterminate reality, from which they could infer 
reasonable solutions.  For example, some policy makers chose to conceptualize a 
situation of excessive slums as a “congenital disease” in need of “medical treatment”, 
while others conceptualized the same slums as a “natural community” comprising 
social networks crucial for the maintenance of cohesion (1993:147).  While these 
separate frames might come into conflict and potentially pose a “meta-problem” in its 
own right, the important point for my present purpose is that the use of metaphors 
allowed a semblance of rational problem-solution identification to emerge out of an 
otherwise ambiguous social situation.  It would have been more difficult to present a 
coherent set of solutions that could be demonstrated to be validly inferred from the 
problem, had the policy makers not resorted to metaphors to construe the situation 
differently.  Of course, whether or not these construals amount to a distorted 
representation of reality, thereby projecting cognitive smoke screens in the name of 
rationalization is another matter altogether.  
Moving to the fourth criterion, I noted in Chapter 2 that criterion D, “the 
knower/believer must be constantly willing to consider new evidence deemed relevant 
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and admissible to the knowledge/beliefs, and alter them if necessary”, pertains more to 
the attitude of the knower/believer rather than the reasoning process, or the actual 
content of a system.   If we combine this attitudinal perspective with the theoretical 
assumption that conceptual metaphors manifest our strong predilection to search for 
metaphorical inferences and productively extend the set of mappings between domains, 
then we ought to be alarmed by the observation that metaphors might actually prove 
detrimental for rationality, when assessed by this criterion.  Drawing upon the most 
recent example of social policy, it is conceivable that a conceptual metaphor that is 
deeply entrenched in the minds of people has the power to detract attention away and 
occlude the genuine nature of affairs that persist in the target domain, or even arouse 
particular emotional sentiments that seem antithetical to the pursuit of rationality (see 
Charteris-Black 2005 for examples from British politics).   
In the context of criterion D, this means that an over-reliance on source domains to 
provide inferential structure might lead to a de-motivation on the part of 
knowers/believers to seek independent development within the target domain itself – or 
worse still, to overlook evidence directly pertinent to the target domain which might not 
possess a metaphorical counterpart in the source domain.  In other words, there might 
come a time in theory development when new knowledge no longer fits nicely with 
existing metaphors for that theory, and the cognitive tendency to over-analogize and 
make use of metaphorical inferences becomes an impediment towards the realization of 
this point.  Hence, even though the early stages of a system’s development typically 
benefit from constitutive metaphors, there is a danger of what I term “metaphorical 
dogmatism” adversely affecting the willingness of knowers/believers to seek insights 
that are necessary for the eventual epistemic independence of the target system.       
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An example of this can be seen in the theory of cognitive grammar, where the metaphor 
of a “network” is employed to illustrate how linguistic units of different degrees of 
schematicity may be variously combined to yield new structures that are interlinked 
(hence the network metaphor) in relationships of categorization, composition and 
symbolization (Langacker, 1999).  Fortunately, Langacker himself was quick to point 
out that “the network metaphor encourages us to think of linguistic structures as 
discrete, object-like entities…(but) all of these features are problematic in regard to the 
neural implementation of language” (1999:95).  The point is that although the network 
metaphor, per criterion B and C, systematizes cognitive grammar concepts and allows 
the pursuit of valid inferences drawn from the domain of networks in general, there 
must come a point when relevant evidence (in this case, neurological evidence) imposes 
an important limit to the extent of analogizing.  If we start off relying too much on the 
network metaphor, and proceed to assume linguistic structures as discrete, object-like 
entities, the relevance of neurological evidence might easily have eluded us.   
The important question now is, are metaphors invariably problematic for criterion D?  
The discussion above was limited to target systems that are inherently sensitive to 
evidence, where the employment of metaphor can be seen as imposing a foreign 
inferential structure that, if carried too far, potentially obscures the target system.  In 
short, if systems are inherently sensitive to evidence, then the proper treatment of such 
evidence can rationally lead to expansion or alteration, without the need of metaphors.  
However, if a system is one where relevant evidence is hard to come by, or perhaps 
even unattainable (which renders the system highly susceptible to failing criterion D), 
we can see that relying on metaphors to structure and articulate these knowledge/beliefs 
actually becomes a means to construct a semblance of passing this criterion.  For 
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example, divinatory systems such as Ba Zi (“Eight Characters”) and Tarot postulate 
metaphorical associations of different aspects of a person’s life with natural substances 
such as fire, water and earth in order to generate predictions and analyses.  While 
nothing internal to the domain of divination itself could conceivably happen to warrant 
a revision to their theories and methods, especially since these theories are often steeped 
in mythical and distant tradition, a designated metaphorical correspondence with the 
domains that govern knowledge of these natural substances (e.g. chemistry, geology) 
can provide the semblance of sensitivity to evidence that is important for criterion D.  A 
practitioner of these systems, for example, might claim that the nature of their 
predictions take into account fluctuations in the quality and quantity of these substances 
that surround the divination-seeker’s life.  My actual case study of Ba Zi in the next 
chapter will elaborate these points in greater detail.   
 
3.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
We have completed the review of our rationality criteria, and the role that metaphors 
can play in their fulfilment.  To reiterate, metaphors are not necessary for rationality, 
and it is not the case that their presence simultaneously fulfils all criteria.  Furthermore, 
as we have seen for criterion D, the employment of metaphor appears in some cases to 
construct at best a semblance of rationality.  This raises further questions, such as 
whether a mere semblance of rationality qualifies the system as rational, or whether 
rationality criteria can be satisfactorily fulfilled to some partial extent.   These are 
certainly fascinating and important questions, but I believe my demonstration that there 
is indeed some positive role for metaphors in a system’s rationality, and the upcoming 
demonstration of the existence of such metaphors in Ba Zi, is sufficient to establish the 
main point of this thesis – that rationality can be facilitated by devices such as metaphor, 
45 
 
and for that reason the popular and ideological view of scientific rationality which leads 
to outright rejection of some systems as irredeemably irrational cannot be uncritically 
supported.  Instead, every system no matter how seemingly irrational on the surface 


















CASE STUDY OF BA ZI 
4.0 BA ZI CATEGORIZED AS ASTROLOGY 
I have thus far argued that the notion of a rational knowledge/belief system has been far 
too often defined with reference to a scientific worldview, and that it is possible to 
conceive of rationality criteria not inherently scientific in outlook.  I have further shown 
in Section 3.2 that conceptual metaphors can be employed in ways that fulfil these 
criteria.  While it may be unsurprising to discover the existence of metaphors in systems 
already deemed rational (e.g. mathematics - see Section 3.1.2), it is the observation of a 
facilitating role played by metaphors in systems widely regarded as irrational that 
should most saliently highlight the relevance and contribution of metaphor towards 
rationality.    
The traditional Chinese astrological and divination system of Ba Zi is one such 
“irrational” system.  Despite its antiquity, Ba Zi continues to enjoy a considerable 
degree of contemporary popularity, sometimes in cultural contexts far removed from its 
origins14. Though practitioners and believers often make claims about the reliability and 
sophistication of Ba Zi on grounds of personal experience and the intricate complexities 
of its concepts, its fundamentally “astrological” character is a virtual stamp of 
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 The spread of Ba Zi to other cultures with their own distinct astrological traditions might raise the 
question of whether potentially new, syncretised varieties undermine the generalizability of my 
characterization.  I have two answers for this.  First, for the purposes of assessing rationality based on my 
criteria, any substantial modification to a knowledge/belief system would best be analyzed as a distinct 
system in its own right without necessarily implicating its origins.  There is thus no claim of 
generalizability.  Second, although empirical work is needed to confirm this, I would think that any 
modified version for Ba Zi would still primarily depend on the same set of conceptual metaphors (i.e. 
mappings from the source domain of element properties) that I am about to illustrate.   
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irrationality from the viewpoint of sceptics.  Being considered a member of the category 
of astrological systems renders it susceptible to well-known arguments against 
astrology as well as a plethora of other divinatory processes – charges of “cold reading”, 
self-fulfilling prophecies, non-falsifiability etc.– virtually all of which point towards an 
implicit requirement for astrological diagnoses to correspond with objective reality15.  
While such objections are certainly valid in the sense that astrological systems mostly 
fail to exhibit the standards stipulated by critics, I argue in this chapter that the 
conceptual metaphorical structure of Ba Zi and its role in fulfilling rationality criteria 
presents an important yet under-examined counter-perspective against categorically 
labelling Ba Zi, together with other similarly structured systems, as irrational.  I begin 
by briefly introducing the historical background of Ba Zi, situating it within the broader 
development of Chinese astrology, before discussing how conventional arguments for 
Ba Zi’s irrationality are typically made by adopting a particularly scientific point of 
view.  The bulk of the chapter is then devoted to exploring the conceptual metaphoric 
structure of Ba Zi, including the nature and function of the mappings involved, in an 
attempt to illustrate their fulfilment of rationality criteria.    
 
4.1 THE IRRATIONALITY OF BA ZI 
Ba Zi, literally translated as “Eight Characters”, is a Chinese divinatory system broadly 
describable as the analysis of patterned interactions of cosmic and elemental energies 
with an individual’s life.  Traditionally classified as one of the “Five Arts” of Chinese 
metaphysics,    its origins as a fully-fledged system are most commonly traced to the 
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 The website www.astrology-and-science.com provides a forum through which ostensibly credible 
scientific research on astrology is published.  It offers a nice summary of principal scientific objections 
against astrology.   
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Tang Dynasty where extensive documentation resulted in the production of notable 
texts such as the Di Tian Sui (滴天髓), Zi Ping Zhen Quan (子平真诠) and Yuan Hai Zi 
Ping (渊海子平).  Some of its most fundamental principles, however, were derived 
from much older cosmogonical myths that expounded upon the existence of a 
primordial “cosmic force”, or Qi, which possessed an inherently dualistic nature of Yin 
and Yang that is microcosmically manifested in all matter. Apart from Qi, Chinese 
cosmogonies also emphasize the significance of the “Five Elements” – Wood, Fire, 
Earth, Metal and Water – which are more commonly construed as an interdependent, 
dynamic flow of processes rather than material entities in their static states (Aylward, 
2007). Abstracting away from more complicated and sectarian-specific methodologies, 
the gist of Ba Zi involves the postulation of correlations between aspects of an 
individuals’ lives and the elements that are deemed by virtue of circumstances of their 
birth to be representative of them.  These circumstances include the year, month, day 
and hour of their birth, which are each assigned two particular characters (hence “Eight 
Characters”).  Every character in turn represents one specific element and is either Yin 
or Yang, the two duals of Qi.  The result is that every individual is characterized by 
eight interacting characters, and a Ba Zi diagnosis involves analyzing the nature of this 
interaction through the basic properties of their representative elements.   
Even a rudimentary sketch of Ba Zi’s main features as provided above reveals aspects 
which can be, and have indeed been, argued as unacceptable violations of scientific 
standards of rationality.  As I briefly rehearse some of the most familiar arguments, I 
draw particular attention to the subtler point that virtually all of them presuppose that 
rationality requires a correspondence with objective “reality” or “truth” – whereas it has 
already been argued in Chapter 2 that neither rationality nor truth need entail the other.  
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The most obvious indication that divinatory systems such as Ba Zi are interrogated 
exclusively on the basis of scientific assumptions is the emphasis of existing research 
on finding out whether or not these systems “work” (i.e. churn out factually accurate 
predictions that tally with objective reality).  Studies tend to employ relatively 
straightforward statistical methodologies to search for positive correlations between 
variables such as zodiac signs and personalities (Gauquelin 1955, 1969 etc.), often with 
inconclusive results.  The tendency however is to regard statistical evidence of positive 
correlations, whenever they appear, as the working of spurious factors or “artefacts”16 -  
a scientifically rational move that reveals the preference for empirically grounded 
explanations. Beneath the lenses of scientific investigation, Ba Zi is treated as a 
predictive framework for the occurrence of actual or “literal” events in the world.   
Another approach typically used for investigating astrological systems can be described 
as a type of “meta-analysis”, where researchers gather a significant pool of data from 
consultation sessions and look for consistency across different practitioners, especially 
when handling individuals who share the same astrological data (Dean, 2007).  I see 
this requirement of inter-subjective verification as mirroring the demands of 
conventional scientific experimentation – a requirement which construes the astrologer 
as an experimenter with the objective of uncovering invariant “facts” about the client’s 
life through a set of methodologies expected to be analogous to those of science.  In Ba 
Zi, for example, the eight defining characters are obtained exclusively from an 
individual’s birth details.  The sort of inter-subjective consistency pursued by science 
would then lead to the expectation that individuals born at the same time must 
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 The reader is again directed to www.astrology-and-science.com for a detailed discussion of artefacts, 
or spurious effects that convey a semblance that astrological predictions are true. 
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necessarily share the exact same diagnosis.   A deviation from these standards would 
then be regarded as symptomatic of irrationality and unreliability.   
The above points certainly do not exhaust characteristic arguments that lead to similarly 
unfavourable conclusions.  My intention is neither to provide a comprehensive review 
nor to attempt to refute these arguments, which could very well be excellent ones, but to 
consider Ba Zi in a manner that does not presuppose the superiority of any particular set 
of assumptions regarding what constitutes reliable or “truthful” knowledge.  Abiding by 
the relatively decontextualized nature of my rationality criteria, I focus more on the 
reasoning processes internal to Ba Zi itself.  It would shortly become apparent that 
conceptual metaphors, involving mappings from a source knowledge structure of 
material substances to a target structure of various aspects of life, underlie much of Ba 
Zi reasoning. 
 
4.2 “HEAVENLY STEMS”, “EARTHLY BRANCHES”, YIN/YANG AND 
ELEMENTS 
As mentioned, the first step towards a Ba Zi analysis requires the subject to provide the 
year, month, day and hour of her birth, based on the Chinese Solar Calendar.  By 
reference to the Wan Nian Li, or “Ten Thousand Year Calendar”, the subject can 
discover, for each of the numerical values of her year, month, day and hour of birth, two 
corresponding Ba Zi characters.  The first character of each set is known as a “heavenly 
stem”, while the second character is an “earthly branch”.  There are a total of ten 
different heavenly stem and twelve different earthly branch characters17 that one may be 
                                                           
17
 The 10 heavenly stems are 甲 Jia, 乙 Yi, 丙 Bing, 丁 Ding, 戊 Wu, 己 Ji, 庚 Geng, 辛 Xin, 壬 Ren 
and 癸 Gui.  The 12 earthly branches are 子 Zi, 丑 Chou, 寅 Yin, 卯 Mao, 晨 Chen, 巳 Si, 午 Wu, 未 Wei, 
申 Shen, 酉 You, 戌 Xu and 亥 Hai. 
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assigned.  This assignment is cyclical in nature (e.g. for the first ten days in a particular 
Chinese solar month, one heavenly stem is assigned to each day.  The process is 
repeated for the next ten days.  A similar twelve-day cycle occurs for the earthly 
branches.  Likewise, this method of cyclical assignment applies to the year, month and 
hour of birth).  
This yields for every individual a total of eight characters, hence the name of the system.  
It should be stated that most Ba Zi analyses further involve an additional component 
known as the “luck pillars”, which are made up of characters representing different 
periods of an individual’s life.  Their interaction with the eight main characters yields 
different diagnoses according to the individual’s current stage of life.  Since the luck 
pillars interact with the eight characters according to the same principles as the internal 
interaction of the eight characters themselves, they constitute a supplementary 
complexity that is not necessary for our present purpose.  Consequently, I shall exclude 
them from the discussion. 
The eight characters are typically diagrammatized as follows, with the four columns 
referred to as the “four pillars”.  Below is a sample Ba Zi diagram from Yap (2005) for 
an individual born on February 20, 1967 at 4:30 p.m., with birth data converted to the 







Hour pillar Day pillar Month pillar Year pillar 
甲 Jia 乙 Yi 壬 Ren 丁 Ding 
申 Shen 卯 Mao 寅 Yin 未 Wei 
Figure 4.1 Sample Ba Zi diagram (Yap, 2005:56) 
 
The interpretation of this set of characters depends upon further assignments.  Each of 
the ten heavenly stems and twelve earthly branches are categorized as either “Yin” or 
“Yang” in an alternating fashion. Furthermore, each of the characters is assigned to one 
of the five elements – Metal, Wood, Water, Fire and Earth (see Figure 4.2 below) – the 
properties of which, as will be seen in Section 4.4, critically determine the analysis of 
the subject’s queries regarding her life.  Another important point is that the Heavenly 
Stem of the Day pillar (Yi  in our example), with its corresponding element, is known as 
the “Day Master”, and is deemed to be most representative of the subject, amongst all 
the eight characters.  All Ba Zi analyses begin with this “Day Master” as a point of 










Heavenly Stem Polarity and Element Earthly Branch Polarity and Element 
甲 Jia Yang Wood 子 Zi Yang Water 
乙 Yi Yin Wood 丑 Chou Yin Earth 
丙 Bing Yang Fire 寅 Yin Yang Wood 
丁 Ding Yin Fire 卯 Mao Yin Wood 
戊 Wu Yang Earth 晨 Chen Yang Earth 
己 Ji Yin Earth 巳 Si Yin Fire 
庚 Geng Yang Metal 午 Wu Yang Fire 
辛 Xin Yin Metal 未 Wei Yin Earth 
壬 Ren Yang Water 申 Shen Yang Metal 
癸 Gui Yin Water 酉 You Yin Metal 
  
戌 Xu Yang Earth 
  
亥 Hai Yin Water 
Figure 4.2 Assignment of polarity and elements to Ba Zi characters 
 
Some practitioners also assign an animal of the Chinese zodiac system to each of the 
twelve earthly branches.  For example, 子 Zi symbolizes the Rat, and 酉 You the 
Rooster.  Such assignments are especially common in the diagnosis of romantic 
relationships (e.g. Too: 1996).  While interesting, its discussion is not necessary for the 
purposes of this thesis. Therefore, leaving animals aside, each character is analyzed via 
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its assigned polarity and element, the two central features of Ba Zi analyses.  Yin 
represents traits such as passivity, darkness, femininity etc., and is schematically 
conceptualized as “weak”, while Yang represents the converse traits of activity, light 
and masculinity, and is conceptualized as “strong”. In his book, Ba Zi – The Destiny 
Code, popular Ba Zi practitioner Joey Yap advises us to “get a mental picture” (2005:29) 
associating characters with their assigned polarity and elements.  Some of the 
associations are described as follows: 
甲 Jia represents Yang Wood.  Jia Wood should be visualized as a great big tree – 
think California Redwoods, think teak trees, think towering solid oaks.  These trees 
are hard and unyielding.  乙 Yi represents Yin Wood.  If Jia Wood is a great solid 
redwood tree, then Yi Wood are the leaves, flowers, small bushes, twines and 
vines and grass.  It is flexible and malleable.  (Yap, 2005:29) 
As emphasized above, properties of wood, especially those that are deemed relevant to 
the schematic characterization of “strong” (e.g. hard, unyielding), are thus assigned to
甲 Jia. Those relevant to the characterization of “weak” are assigned to 乙 Yi.  Likewise, 
丙 Bing is assigned to Yang Fire – “fire of the sun, bright, vibrant and life-giving”, and 
丁 Ding to Yin Fire – “fire of the candle, small but illuminating in the darkness”, and so 
on for all the other characters.   
At this preliminary point, the astute reader might have noticed my recurrent use of the 
term “assignment” to denote fundamental correspondences between Ba Zi categories 
(i.e. heavenly stems, earthly branches) and seemingly unrelated information such as 
birth data and substances that have been labelled “elements” 18  or “processes”.  
                                                           
18
 Obviously the categorization of wood, fire etc. as “elements” is incorrect from the viewpoint of modern 
chemistry.  However, consensus about the general properties of these substances is of greater importance 
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Specifically, there are two stages of assignment.  The initial assignment of an 
individual’s birth data to the set of heavenly stems/earthly branches is followed up with 
a further assignment of the latter to the five elements and a Yin/Yang, or strong/weak 
polarity.  Joey Yap’s “mental picture” is an explicit invitation to view Ba Zi characters 
as somehow embodying the properties of these elements in both their “strong” and 
“weak” manifestations, even though there is neither a lexical nor conceptual 
relationship between the characters and elements.  Once these axiomatic 
correspondences 19  are accepted, we can then recruit our knowledge structure of 
elements, constituted by a fairly basic understanding of their fundamental properties, as 
a source domain for the purpose of performing a Ba Zi analysis. However, the question 
naturally arises as to why such correspondences should be accepted, since they are 
based upon astrological assumptions that are commonly frowned upon - for example, 
there is no conceivable reason why there should be exactly ten branches and twelve 
stems, and why they should correlate with birth data.  Though criterion A (A body of 
knowledge/beliefs should be demonstrable as subscribing to some fundamental set of 
values and/or epistemic assumptions, which cannot be invalidated by the methods of 
rival systems) might be summoned here to argue that astrological assumptions cannot 
be deemed irrational solely on the basis of their incompatibility with science, my task in 
the next chapter is to suggest that rather than merely asserting these correspondences in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
for the present purpose, and thus I shall use the label “elements” throughout the dissertation as a matter of 
convenience.   
19
 Some might be inclined to view these correspondences as metaphors in their own right (i.e. “BIRTH 
DATA ARE CHARACTERS”, “CHARACTERS ARE ELEMENTS”).  I discourage this primarily 
because I am basing my analysis on a conceptualist viewpoint of metaphor, which would impose as a 
necessary condition for metaphoricity that the two domains must demonstrate a commonality in image-
schematic structure (Lakoff, 1993).  In my opinion no such commonality exists between numbers, 
characters and substances, thus no real “mapping” in the conceptualist sense takes place.   
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Ba Zi, practitioners need to rely on various strategies to persuade us of the plausibility 
of accepting the correspondences.   
 
4.3 INFERENTIAL STRUCTURES IN THE SOURCE DOMAIN OF ELEMENTS 
While basic individual characteristics of the five elements are not difficult to figure out, 
Ba Zi systematizes the interrelationships between elements via the postulation of three 
interactional “cycles”.  These spell out how elements may “produce”, “control” and 
“weaken” one another.  Akin to “strong” and “weak” elements, these predicative terms 
should be understood schematically in order to encompass a broader range of possible 
interrelationships.  “Production”, for example, might also be thought of as 
“strengthening” or “supporting”, while control broadly means “to guide and to keep in 
order” (Yap, 2005: 121). As will be seen shortly, the nature of these interrelationships 
constitutes the main inferential structures that are mapped onto corresponding aspects 
of the individual seeker’s life.  The three cycles (productive, controlling and weakening) 
are reproduced from Yap (2005) and explained below: 




Interactional properties: Fire burns material into ashes to form earth [hence producing 
earth]; earth is the source of minerals including some metals; metal through 
condensation produces water; water nourishes plants/wood; and, wood is used as fuel to 






create fire.  This cycle organizes the elements into inter-relationships of production, 
support and strengthening, based on their common observable properties. 
The Controlling Cycle  
                          
 
 
Interactional properties:  Fire controls metal since it melts and moulds metals; metal 
controls wood since metallic tools (e.g. axe, saw, scissors) chop or trim trees/bushes.  
Wood controls earth since a group of trees can prevent a landslide.  Earth controls water 
since any large body of water is naturally bordered by land.  Water extinguishes, hence 
controls fire. This cycle organizes the elements into inter-relationships of restriction, 
containment and restraint, based on their common observable properties. 




Interactional properties:  The weakening cycle is simply the productive cycle 





(“” = “controls”) 






These cycles do not and are not meant to exhaust all possible inferences that can be 
drawn based on common knowledge of elemental properties.  Although seldom overtly 
stated, the cycles are instead meant to organize interrelationships based on the most 
salient aspects of interaction, with the consequence that inferencing often becomes a 
relatively straightforward affair.  As Yap (2005: 122) puts it, “learning the controlling 
cycle (as well as the other cycles, presumably) is relatively easy as long as you focus on 
thinking pictorially and using logical deduction”.  The cycles ensure that each element 
is related to every other element either via production, control or weakening, generating 
a richness and productivity of inference that is mapped onto the target domain, thereby 
providing a coherent framework for explicating relationships between aspects of the 
seeker’s life that the elements represent.   A sample analysis in the next section will 
illustrate this, although as already mentioned with the exclusion of luck pillars (Section 
4.2) a detailed diagnosis is beyond both the scope of the thesis and the expertise of the 
author. Nonetheless, as we shall see, even a fundamental analysis relies crucially on the 
inferential productivity of the source domain, and is sufficient to illustrate the fulfilment 












4.4 A SAMPLE BA ZI ANALYSIS 
Hour pillar Day pillar Month pillar Year pillar 
甲 Jia 乙 Yi 壬 Ren 丁 Ding 
申 Shen 卯 Mao 寅 Yin 未 Wei 
Figure 4.1 Sample Ba Zi diagram (Yap, 2005:56) 
 
A sample Ba Zi analysis will now be provided based on the above chart, reproduced 
from Figure 4.1 above, of a female individual born on February 20, 1967 at 4:30 p.m.  
Recall that the Heavenly Stem of the Day pillar (i.e. Day Master), along with its 
corresponding element and polarity, is taken to represent the seeker.  In our example, 
she is conceptualized as Yi, “weak wood”.  This seemingly axiomatic correspondence is 
like those other correspondences that are held to exist between stems/branches, birth 
data and elements (see Section 4.2). The question of how a homology is argued to exist 
in the face of apparently complete arbitrariness will be pursued in the next chapter.  For 
now I draw the attention of the reader to the metaphorical inferencing that underlies Ba 
Zi analysis.  
Metaphorical inferencing begins once the seeker decides which aspect of her life she 
wants to focus on.  Just as the schematic intra-domain relationships of production, 
control and weakening are deemed to hold in the knowledge structure of elemental 
properties (source), the same schemas are deemed to exist between the seeker and 
various aspects of her life (target). Thus the seeker controls, amongst other aspects, her 






ones.  When asked how she would fare in regulating her finances, for example, the 
practitioner has to first ascertain what the seeker’s “wealth element” is, based on the 
control cycle, before assessing how successfully this wealth element can be controlled 
based on the overall interaction of  all elements in the chart.  Figure 4.3 below shows a 
sample of possible mappings that regulate such inferences.   Points a-c refer to entities 








Figure 4.3 Sample of possible mappings from elements (source) to seeker (target) 
 
In our example, the seeker is represented by wood and her wealth element is earth.  In 
order for wood to control earth successfully, which metaphorically translates to the 
seeker regulating her finances well, there must be a significant presence of wood in the 
chart.  This is especially important for the present case, since her constitution is Yin 
(“weak”) wood (cf. Section 4.2; “bushes and vines instead of trees”).  
SOURCE 
a. day master element (e.g. 
weak wood) 
b. “wealth element” (earth) 
c. “element- of-loved-ones” 
(metal) 
d. ability of day master to 
control wealth element 
e. ability of day master to 
support element of loved 
ones   
TARGET 
a. the seeker 
b. the seeker’s wealth 
condition 
c. the seeker’s relationships 
with loved ones 
d. ability of the seeker to 
control her wealth 
e. ability of day master to 







The most straightforward situation that would point towards a positive prognosis is the 
presence of a fair number of other wood characters in the chart (Jia, Yi, Yin or Mao – 
see Figure 4.2).   If, for instance, a majority of the eight characters are wood, the 
practitioner can draw the conclusion that earth is soundly subdued.  In our example, the 
seeker has as many as four wood characters, and just one earth character.  The 
remaining three characters of metal, water and fire play a less important role due to 
their smaller quantity. Despite their diminished importance, we might note that the 
solitary water character further strengthens wood, although fire correspondingly 
strengthens earth.  As Yap would again have us visualize, the situation can be construed 
as many trees (wood) successfully containing a landslide (earth), which metaphorically 
translates to the seeker successfully gaining control over her finances.  Interestingly, as 
a commitment to the so-called “Chinese” philosophical ideal of striking a balance in all 
matters (Liu, 2006), an overwhelming number of wood characters is likely to be 
negatively interpreted as exerting too much control – as an aside, the ideal level of 
control one should yield is entirely debatable.  The point is that whatever the ideal case 
is deemed to be, a mapping from the magnitude of wood to the magnitude of control 
holds. 
Had our seeker faced a dearth of wood characters, the situation could be salvaged by the 
presence of water characters (Ren, Gui, Zi or Hai), since water strengthens wood.  This 
“indirect” avenue is however understandably less preferred, as water is itself controlled 
by earth, the element at issue, and thus its potency to strengthen wood is limited.  
Besides illustrating the productivity of metaphoric inference, these various inferential 
possibilities also guide practitioners of the closely-related field of Feng Shui (geomancy) 
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to prescribe the literal installation of wood or water-related objects in the seeker’s home 
in cases where the chart is unfavourable.   
The interested reader can likewise apply the three cycles and conduct simple analyses 
for other aspects of life, although it must be reiterated that numerous other more 
complex methods exist.  The above sample analysis is however adequate to illustrate 
the inferential processes that underlie fundamental Ba Zi reasoning – processes which 
more complicated methods invariably return to at some point. In subsequent sections I 
attempt to characterize the Ba Zi metaphor in terms of the theoretical framework for 
metaphor laid out in Chapter 3, and proceed to discuss how they might fulfil rationality 
criteria.    
 
4.5 BA ZI METAPHOR AS CONSTITUTIVE 
Up to this point I have discussed how fundamental Ba Zi analysis involves an initial 
stage of axiomatic assignment, which sanctions the use of knowledge about elements as 
a source domain, followed by the latter stage of metaphoric inferencing, which 
systematically maps the source domain onto the target domain of individual life aspects 
via the Productive, Controlling and Weakening Cycles.  One might ask how this 
metaphorical mapping fits into the brief typology outlined in Chapter 3, where I made a 
distinction between explanatory, underlying and constitutive metaphors. In brief, 
explanatory metaphors are employed mostly as simplifying analogies in cases where the 
target concept(s) is already internally coherent, while underlying and constitutive 
metaphors are often relied upon to provide new insights from a coherent and 
inferentially productive source domain to nourish a relatively impoverished target.  The 
main difference between the latter two, which is not always clear cut, lies in their 
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relative reliance on the “linguistic machinery” of the source.   Underlying metaphors 
might be expressed in surface terms belonging to the target (e.g. mathematical symbols), 
while for constitutive metaphors the target is parasitic upon the source’s jargon.  
The way I have defined these distinctions implies that a classification of metaphors 
depends, first and foremost, on the degree of internal coherence of the target domain.  
In the case of Ba Zi, we can roughly describe the target as “the domain of the seeker 
and various aspects of her life”.  Independent of a subscription to some regulatory 
framework that we might call “fate” or “god’s plan” (or, as a matter of fact, the system 
of Ba Zi itself) etc. it is difficult to elucidate a principled, logical interconnectedness 
between multiple aspects of an individual’s life, at least not to an extent normally 
describable as internally coherent.  This suggests that Ba Zi mappings from the 
elements to seeker-domain are not merely explanatory in function.  Even though the 
target seeker-domain is not entirely inferentially austere in the sense that within itself, 
relationships such as production, control and weakening might be independently 
construed without the need of a source, it is clear that reasoning about the nature of 
these relationships proceeds by importing the way these relationships unfold in the 
source domain of elements. It goes without saying that a greater degree of internal 
coherence is perceived to be present in the source than in the target.   
For the remaining choice between underlying and constitutive metaphors the most 
straightforward diagnostic is whether the target system possesses an adequate and 
productively used terminology such that source terminology need not be overtly 
employed.  As already mentioned, Boyd (1993) discusses constitutive metaphors 
mainly in the context of the evolutionary trajectory of scientific theories.  I think that Ba 
Zi mappings are constitutive but not in the particular Boydian sense of implicating 
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target domain development, since it is unclear how we might even speak of 
“development” in the seeker-domain.  The constitutive nature of the Ba Zi metaphor can 
actually be gleaned from a rather fundamental point – an overt employment of element-
domain jargon as an alternative framework to explicate relationships in the seeker-
domain is precisely what characterizes Ba Zi as a system.  I dare say that such 
irreducible metaphoricity holds for numerous other divinatory systems (e.g. Tarot).  
Without some alternative terminology employed in divination the whole idea of 
understanding one’s life through a different perspective collapses.  For illustrative 
purposes I present snippets of analyses from three different sources (Yap, 2005; Too, 
1999; Hee, 1996) demonstrating the centrality of source-domain terminology in Ba Zi.  
This lady is Yi Wood, born in Yin month. Yin is the season of spring, when 
the wood element is the strongest…this Yi Wood is strong and vibrant. 
What it needs is some output element, which is fire.  Fire helps bring 
warmth to the cold, early spring month.  Fire also brings balance to the chart 
as the wood is strong and needs to be weakened a little. So the favourable 
element is fire, which is right next to the Day Master! … Her talents will 
bring her wealth as fire produces earth, her wealth element.  This person 
also already has wealth elements in her chart…she will eventually be very 
wealthy. (Yap, 2005:177-178) 
 
Thus while water may be good for wood, too much water will overwhelm 
wood.  Take for instance the case of the businessman, born in a wood year.  
Quite rightly, his father put water in his name.  But the name given was 
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“Tua Hai” (Hokkien for “big sea”) – definitely a case of too much water.  
The sea will surely engulf the little plant! (Too, 1999:29) 
  
Margaret Thatcher, a former British Prime Minister: a person of excessively 
strong metal who needs fire, representing power and status, to control and 
dilute the strong metal… (Hee, 1996:45) 
 
4.6 HOW RATIONALITY CRITERIA ARE FULFILLED IN BA ZI 
In the previous chapter I examined how metaphors in general might function to fulfil 
the rationality criteria spelt out in Chapter 2, providing examples from a range of 
knowledge and belief systems in different domains such as education and social policy.  
One of the points mentioned was that the class of explanatory metaphors is least likely 
to play any significant role in the rationality of a system. Thus, my classification of the 
Ba Zi metaphor as constitutive should lead to the expectation that it stands as a good 
candidate to be analyzed along the same lines as my previous examples.  As usual I 
proceed sequentially from criterion A-D.   
Recall that with regard to criterion A (a body of knowledge/beliefs should be 
demonstrable as subscribing to some fundamental set of values and/or epistemic 
assumptions, which cannot be invalidated by the methods of rival systems) metaphors 
have been viewed as ontology-changing devices which allow the source to bestow a 
concrete ontology, or inferential structure, upon the target.  I also mentioned that the 
source domain itself would evidently need to be based on a coherent, well-formed set of 




In many cases no inferential structure exists in the target prior to introducing the 
metaphor (e.g. infant scientific theories), but in situations where a target ontology does 
exist to whatever degree of well-formedness the source ontology can be seen as 
“overwriting” the former (e.g. beliefs about love).  Whether we choose to view the Ba 
Zi metaphor as bestowing or overwriting depends on our assessment of how well-
formed the target seeker-domain is, but in order to be contributory towards the 
rationality of the target, it is obvious that the source must not only be superior in well-
formedness, but must be sufficiently so to pass criterion A.   
The superiority of source to target is an almost inherent feature in any divinatory system, 
since it is precisely ambivalence or uncertainty towards life that leads one to turn to a 
more revelatory source.  In my own culture at least, there is to the best of my 
knowledge no coherent set of shared assumptions underpinning facts and beliefs 
regarding the diverse aspects of our lives without invoking some external model of 
understanding.  Conversely, in the source domain of elements interrelationships 
between the various target-domain analogues are experientially familiar and reasonably 
well-understood.  Once the employment of element properties as a source domain is 
sanctioned by an acceptance of some initial axiomatic correspondences (see Section 
4.2), metaphoric inferencing operates such that challenging the assumptions upon which 
Ba Zi claims are made is tantamount to challenging the assumptions upon which basic 
interactional properties of elements are observed.  Since these interactional properties 
can arguably be classified as (prototypically rational) “scientific” knowledge, we should 
not be surprised to find practitioners  rhetorically buttressing the reasoning processes 
behind Ba Zi by claiming that they are “based on science”.  Apart from such scientistic 
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rhetorical manoeuvres, however, the point here is that it is through the metaphorical 
source domain that the target system passes a major criterion of rationality.      
Criterion B, that of internal consistency, requires that no (propositionally stated) 
knowledge or beliefs contradict one another within a system.  Ba Zi facilitates this by 
imposing discrete ontological boundaries onto the seeker’s life aspects, via a 
conceptualization of these aspects as material elements.  These elements are further 
interrelated in a fairly unambiguous manner through the non-overlapping productive 
and controlling cycles, and the neat reciprocity between the productive and weakening 
cycles.  This means that there would not be a situation where two particular elements in 
a subject’s Ba Zi are interpreted to influence each other in a contradictory way.  For 
example, pursuant to a query which invokes reference to the productive cycle, 
inferences about the relationships between any two elements would only be made based 
on how one might produce the other.  There is no confusion where these two elements 
also demonstrate a relationship of control, which would have led to contradictory 
advice being given.  Therefore, while one might be led to speculate on the various 
potential interconnections between different aspects of her life, Ba Zi mappings which 
constrain and make precise the range of possible interrelationships between target 
domain entities help to avert the risk of incurring contradictions.    
Criterion C states that claims and conclusions drawn on the basis of the 
knowledge/beliefs must demonstrably follow from them in a way deemed reasonably 
valid by relevant rules of inference, and the point was made in Chapter 3 that although 
invalid or fallacious reasoning can still be committed within the source domain, its 
greater coherence should help to reduce the likelihood of criterion C being violated.  
One test of whether the Ba Zi source domain of elements serves this function well is to 
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see if the reasoning processes within it can be sufficiently and precisely characterized 
by particular rules of inference.  This is important since premises and conclusions made 
within any rational system should be able to flesh out the relevant schematic inferential 
rules which allow the system to expand.   Adopting terminology from Mohanan, 
Mohanan and Abraham (2004), much of Ba Zi analysis appears to involve either 
defeasible deductive or abductive reasoning.  Whichever elements come to represent 
different aspects of the seeker’s life as well as their relative qualities can be 
unambiguously deduced from the three cycles, although Ba Zi does admit that other 
factors might possibly operate to invalidate its conclusions (more of this in the 
discussion of criterion D).  To the extent that Ba Zi is deemed similar to a medical 
diagnosis, abductive reasoning is also salient, where certain happenings in a seeker’s 
life are construed as “effects” which the theory of the three cycles are able to locate a 
“cause” for.   The effect of financial impoverishment, for example, might be diagnosed 
via the cycles as caused by poor control of the day master element over the wealth 
element.  In the ostensible absence of a solitary and unambiguous logic connecting the 
various aspects of one’s life in the target domain, it would be difficult to attain the same 
level of precise characterization of reasoning had the metaphor not existed. 
Criterion D is perhaps the most interesting of the four when related to metaphor, for it 
pertains neither to abstract ontological structure nor schematic inferential rules, but 
focuses more on the willingness of knowers/believers to admit relevant evidence.  I 
argued in Chapter 3 that it is our cognitive predilection to (over)extend metaphoric 
inferencing that might lead to an inability or unwillingness to recognize watershed 
moments in target domain development where we need to abandon the prevailing 
source domain(s). Though quite unlike typical instances in scientific theory change, 
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such metaphorical dogmatism might nonetheless exist in Ba Zi, for instance when a 
seeker concerned with increasing her wealth refuses to consider other solutions inherent 
in the target domain (e.g. following a prudent investment plan, or simply cutting back 
on expenditure).  In Feng Shui, this tendency might be even more pronounced as 
practitioners place great emphasis on the literal presence of favourable elements (e.g. 
fish tanks for water, plants for wood) in our lives.  It must be said, however, that most 
Ba Zi practitioners recognize the negative light that such dogmatism casts on their 
practice, and would be eager to claim that other factors such as “hard work” and “luck” 
(Yap, 2005:7) ought to be considered alongside one’s chart.  This concession obviously 
detracts a fair deal of explanatory power away from Ba Zi, and could even be seen as 
creating a disclaimer against inaccurate diagnoses, especially if the practitioner is 
unable to systematically determine when circumstances are beyond the system’s 
analytical scope.  There is a clear difference between simply asserting that other factors 
might be present to occasionally invalidate an analysis and being conscious about its 
precise limitations and when these limitations are met.  It is not obvious at all how 
metaphor can contribute towards attainment of the latter.  
Although the above remarks suggest that metaphors are detrimental for criterion D, 
systems like Ba Zi can actually acquire a semblance of sensitivity to relevant evidence 
since constitutive metaphors afford us grounds to conceptually conflate source and 
target entities to such an extent that sensitivity to evidence within the source domain 
itself replaces the requirement for sensitivity in the target.  By supposedly embodying 
the properties and characteristics of elements, interpretation of characters is in principle 
bound by the rational commitment to be revised in the (unlikely) event that new 
interactional properties that invalidate old ones are discovered.  Whether Ba Zi would 
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actually revise its fundamental principles is of course an open question, but the point is 
that the constitutive character of the Ba Zi metaphor allows the burden of sensitivity in 
the target to be depicted as being transferrable to the source.  Though I feel that 
metaphors by and large impede criterion D, this facilitating aspect should not be 
ignored for the present discussion.  
 
4.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have provided a case study from Ba Zi to demonstrate how metaphors 
can fulfil rationality criteria in an actual belief system, no less one that is commonly 
perceived as being irrational. From this single example we can inductively suggest that 
there might exist many other knowledge/belief systems likewise metaphorically 
structured, which ought to be evaluated not just under a revised set of rationality criteria 
(Chapter 2), but probed for the operation of facilitating metaphors as well.   
The case for a semblance of rationality in Ba Zi has not been fully made, however,  in 
light of observations made earlier in the chapter about the need to examine the basis 
upon which initial assignments are stipulated.  On what account do we accept the initial 
correspondences of birth data with characters, and characters with elements?  After all, 
these correspondences are vital in sanctioning the usage of element properties as a 
source domain for Ba Zi analysis.  Indeed, for the class of constitutive metaphors in 
general, there is a need to ask the question of why certain source domains are 
“particularly suitable” (Section 3.1.3) compared to others.  Since in most constitutive 
cases the target system only becomes well-formed after undergoing metaphorization, 
surely the initial choice of source domain cannot be regarded as an unmotivated process 
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of whimsical arbitrariness20.  The next chapter attempts to elucidate the historical roots 
of initial Ba Zi correspondences, and suggest how the necessary endeavour of 















                                                           
20
 In the case of the mind-as-computer metaphor used in early cognitive psychology, for example, we can 
formulate a case that the source domain choice was motivated by prevailing philosophical assumptions 




BIRTH DATA, CHARACTERS AND ELEMENTS – THE LOSS AND 
MAINTENANCE OF HOMOLOGY 
5.0 HOMOLOGYAS A CRITERION FOR SOURCE DOMAIN CHOICE 
In the last chapter, I showed how source-to-target mappings including the appropriation 
of source-domain epistemic assumptions contribute towards the fulfilment of rationality 
criteria, emphasizing that the question of why particular source domains turn out to be 
“suitable” cannot be left unanswered.  If we once again consider the context of 
scientific theory development, where initial source domain choice is very likely a 
matter of paradigmatic selection (cf. Dirven, 2002) amongst competing candidates, one 
of the main selection factors besides the well-formedness of the source (see discussion 
of Criterion A in Section 3.2) would have been the extent to which the metaphor 
successfully capitalizes upon pre-existing conceptual similarity between source and 
target.  Although the target system may yet be in an amorphous state, some basic form 
of either real or intuitive homology between source and target is important to encourage 
continued pursuit of metaphoric inferences. An example comes from Nicolas Léonard 
Sadi Carnot’s (1824) conceptualization of the Carnot thermodynamic cycle, where 
significant insights regarding heat flow (target) were generated by probing its known 
similarities with water flow (source).   Though another source might also have 
successfully fulfilled rationality criteria (transferring epistemic assumptions and 
bestowing inferential structures etc.), a stronger homology is likely to be preferred over 
one where the relational predicates between source and target appear relatively opaque.  
73 
 
On this note one might recall popular idioms such as “love is a butterfly”21 where 
dissimilarities between the two domains outweigh similarities, causing the metaphor to 
be unconvincing.   
At first glance, no such strong homology exists in the initial correspondences between 
birth data, characters and elements in Ba Zi.  There are no obvious conceptual links 
between i) the numerical details of a person’s birth, ii) elements and their properties and 
iii) characters which denote neither time nor elements. Consequently, the employment 
of elemental properties as an inferentially productive source domain, which is crucial 
for the rationality of Ba Zi, appears to be unmotivated and vulnerable to accusations of 
“mysticism”, irrelevance or even irrationality. The general point is that any 
systematicity or logical validity underlying source-to-target mappings can be rather 
easily overlooked in the presence of obvious surface dissimilarities between the target 
system to be understood, and the source of this understanding. The requirement for 
source and target to be conceptually not too far apart can be thought of as an additional 
criterion specific to the contributory role of metaphors to rationality.     
In this chapter I have two main objectives – firstly, I will show that some connection 
between these dissimilar aspects did indeed exist in the form of a perceived experiential 
contiguity22 during an earlier historical period; and secondly, I suggest that due to the 
gradual loss of this perception, as evidenced by how tenuous the contiguity currently 
appears to be, there is a need for present-day Ba Zi writers/practitioners to employ 
particular strategies in an attempt to reaffirm the connection, thereby sanctioning the 
                                                           
21
 The full version goes something like this: “love is a butterfly – try catching it and it will evade you; 
remain still, however, and it will eventually land on your shoulder”. The only mappings involve the 
responses of a butterfly when being chased or left alone, making the metaphor inferentially unproductive.   
22
 I borrow this term from Nicholas Riemer’s (2002) discussion of metonymy.  
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source domain choice which facilitates rational metaphorical inferencing thereafter.   
By surveying a small sample of contemporary books and websites, I offer a brief review 
of whether this has actually been done.  I conclude the chapter by commenting that 
shifting socio-cultural practices, which may influence perceptions of source-target 
homology as in the case of Ba Zi, remind us for future analyses to always give careful 
consideration to the wider socio-cultural contexts within which particular systems are 
embedded.  
 
5.1 CONTIGUITY AND CORRELATION  BETWEEN CHARACTERS, TIME 
AND ELEMENTS 
Our intuition about the apparent lack of a motivated significance between temporal 
periods, characters, and elements was suitably described by Paul Carus (1992:53) when 
he remarked that “the original meaning of the ten stems and twelve branches has 
practically been lost sight of, and both systems have become simply series of 
figures…while their symbolical relations, the former with the elements, the latter with 
the twelve animals, are of importance merely to occultists”. His remarks suggest that 
contemporary application of these “symbolical relations” in systems like Ba Zi accept 
them as a matter of axiomatic commitment, with the felicitous consequence that a 
productive source domain becomes available for rational inferencing.   Although the 
Western system of dating using arabic numerals is nowadays common even in Chinese 
societies, the prevalent use of stems and branches to demarcate dates can be traced to 
inscriptions on oracle bones of the Shang dynasty.  As an example of the prominence of 
this system, Shang emperors were unanimously named after the stems that likely 
marked their birth or ascension dates (Walters, 2005:72).  Sinologists believe that a 
“sexagenary system” used to name years and days (see Figure 5.1), derived by 
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permutating the stems and branches into a sixty-pair series, can in fact be attributed to 
the even earlier period of the reign of Hwang Ti, the Yellow Emperor (approx 2697 – 
2597 B.C.). 
 
Figure 5.1 The Sexagenary system of assigning stems and branches to roman-numeric 
years (Carus, 1992:54) 
 
Thus, the process of assigning Ba Zi characters to numerical birth data has its roots in 
the institutionalized practice of relating temporal periods to stems and branches.  With 
this historical understanding, the perception of an ungrounded arbitrariness or 
straightforward dissimilarity between numbers and characters is somewhat attenuated – 
the latter is not spontaneously deployed, but constitutes a calendrical system for the 
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former.  More problematic is the relatively opaque motivation behind assigning 
elements to these characters and the time periods they signify.   
There is however good evidence that elements and time periods used to be correlated in 
such a way that it is plausible to speak of an experiential contiguity or a metonymic 
basis between these two seemingly unrelated domains.  In ancient China, one of the 
most prominent methods of demarcating temporal periods was based on the four 
seasons, most likely due to their obvious implications for agricultural activity. 
Felicitously, certain salient physical and material events directly associated with the 
elements and their properties also manifest themselves during particular seasons, 
resulting in recurrent scenes in which time periods and elements were correlated and 
co-experienced.  One of the standard ancient texts on Chinese astrology, Huai Nan Zi 
(The Book of the Prince of Huai Nan), documents these in detail. For example, wood 
correlates with the beginning of plant life in spring while metallic tools are used to 
harvest crops at the autumn harvest.  Fire is an intuitive correlate with the midsummer 
heat while the icy winter naturally correlates with water (Alyward 2007:31, Walters 
2005:77).  Since stems and branches are already correlated with time periods, a further 
concordance between stems and branches and elements becomes relatively 
straightforward23. 
Such perceived experiential contiguity pertains not only to agriculturally salient periods 
of temporality, but also to large-scale political events such as the rise and fall of 
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 However, it must be qualified that there was (and sometimes, still is) a lack of unanimity regarding 
these correlations, in large part due to rather awkward processes such as distributing 12 branches between 
5 elements (12 is not divisible by 5).  Walters refers to typical resolutions as “philosophical juggling” 
(2005:30), but rather than detailing the relative merits of different systems of correlations, the more 




dynasties.  The following extract from Lü Shi Chun Chiu, ‘The Spring and Autumn 
Annals of Mr. Lü’ (c. 239 BC), regarded as one of the “Five Classics” of Chinese 
literature, is illuminating: 
 
The birth of a new dynasty is foretold by certain signs.  The reign of Huang 
Ti, the Yellow Emperor, was marked by the appearance of giant worms and 
ants, showing that the element Earth was dominant.  For this reason, Earth 
was chosen as the emblem of the dynasty, and Yellow for the colour of the 
livery. Then during the reign of Yü the Great, the auspicious signs were 
trees which did not shed their leaves in Autumn or Winter; this revealed the 
element Wood to be dominant, and Green was chosen as the colour of the 
livery.  King T’ang’s dynasty was heralded by a bronze sword emerging 
from the water, so the dominant element was Metal, and the livery White… 
(Walters 2005:39) 
 
Notice how the correlations between elements and dynastic periods were further 
iconized via emblems and the colours of liveries.  Though no detailed exposition on the 
precise relationships between characters, time periods and elements has been presented 
here, I trust that the relevant point has been made – in earlier times, a far closer 
(experiential) association between the three aspects was indeed present, which offers a 
solution for the “domain suitability problem” mentioned at the outset of this chapter.  
With time however, experiential scenes involving activities such as agriculture 
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gradually became rarer, resulting in the contemporary perception of unmotivated 
arbitrariness24.   
 
5.2 STRATEGIES FOR REINSTATING HOMOLOGY 
Unlike examples of scientific theories that have already been discussed (e.g. cognitive 
psychology; see Section 3.2), knowledge systems such as astrology or divination tend to 
be relatively static and unchanging.  This implies that instead of following a Boydian 
trajectory of possible source domain change, these systems largely rely on the same 
metaphor(s).  One major consequence is that any perceived loss of homology between 
target and source (as we have seen) cannot be remedied by simply switching to a 
different source, especially if these metaphors are constitutive of the system.  Instead, 
some method must be employed to reinstate the initial homology and “reconstruct” the 
relevant metaphor(s).   
A straightforward way of doing so is for writers/practitioners simply to make explicit 
the relevant historical connections, as I have done in the previous section.  When faced 
with a presumably non-specialist audience likely to be more interested in how the 
system “operates”, however, another plausible strategy might be to utilize graphic or 
textual cues which invite readers to construe some form of similarity between Ba Zi 
characters and the five elements without necessarily mentioning historical details.  On 
the other hand, as will be shown later in this section, it is also not uncommon for this 
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 A linguistic example (taken from Jing-Schmidt, 2008) might further illustrate such a mechanism.  
Consider the Chinese word 赤 chi, which means both “red” and “naked” in a seemingly non-polysemic 
(i.e. unrelated, arbitrary) way.   However, a metonymic meaning extension can be argued for, whereby 
redness and nakedness co-occur with a newborn infant.   Once we depart from this specific scene, 
however, and use chi to denote abstract bareness/nakedness, the meaning “redness” becomes opaque.   
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aspect to be overlooked altogether, as a fair number of contemporary websites evince a 
tendency  merely to assert some inherent link between the two dissimilar domains.   
Joey Yap’s (2005) introductory Ba Zi text is exemplary in its use of explicit cues, both 
graphically and textually.  In terms of graphic cues, Yap depicts both stem-and-branch 
characters as well as elements in similar square boxes, placing each corresponding pair 
side-by-side (see Figure 5.2 below).  The likely intention is to strategically motivate a 
perception of conceptual resemblance between characters and elements via maximal 
formal resemblance. The graphical boundary enclosing characters and elements thus 
(metaphorically) becomes an ontological boundary such that both source and target are 
perceived to be ontologically similar, rendering mappings more intuitively acceptable.  
Incidentally, notice also the provision of an experientially familiar example for each of 
the elements (candles, boulders, soil), a move that further concretizes source domain 




Figure 5.2 Graphical depictions of character-element correspondences (Yap, 2005:30) 
 
It is not difficult to imagine other visual strategies that would likewise attempt to 
construct conceptual resemblance via formal resemblance.  For example, further 
iconicity can be achieved by designing the logographic Chinese characters such that 
they resemble the element they are assigned to.  The top horizontal stroke of “丁”, for 
instance, might be drawn to look like a flame, while the vertical stroke can resemble a 
candle.  Though such strategies obviously seem contrived to more critical audiences, 
they might well be adequately persuasive for others.   
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There is no lack of textual cues in Yap (2005) inviting construals of resemblance as 
well.  He exhorts readers to “picture a Ba Zi and see the elements in pictorial form”, and 
to “not just focus on the text”, but to “try and get a mental picture of the Ten Heavenly 
Stems” (2005:30, emphasis mine).  More subtly, notice how the textual description 
below each of the character-element pairs (Figure 5.2) initially employs the verb 
“represents”, but quickly shifts to the attributive verb “is”, when characterizing the 
relationship between characters and elements. While I hesitate to ascribe full authorial 
intention behind this subtle shift from a relationship of correspondence to one of 
equivalence, the effect nonetheless remains – arbitrariness is played down and 
homology is emphasized.   
From these examples it is clear that different visual and textual strategies are available 
for use by writers/practitioners, particularly in cases where a homology between source 
and target, real or perceived, no longer holds.    It is worth pointing out that while some 
writers actively employ these strategies, many others seem either to overlook their 
usefulness, or seem to deem it unnecessary to conceptually connect these unrelated 
aspects.  Many websites, ostensibly designed with an introductory purpose in mind, 
unanimously fail to move beyond generic comments about the nature of astrology to 
include any explanation regarding why characters are assigned to elements.  The 
following quotes from four sample sites 25  provide an indication of how the 
appropriateness of these assignments is oftentimes asserted, rather than explained: 
 
                                                           
25
 Last accessed 27 August 2008.  The quoted sites appeared at or near the top of a frequency-based 
internet search, which testifies to their presumed popularity.   
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When the Eight Characters are analysed, they are related to the Five 
Elements and then their various strengths and weaknesses considered. 
(www.earnshaw.com/fate_manipulation) 
The first set of words is the set of the Ten Heavenly Stems. They are the yin 
and yang components of the Five Elements: Yang Wood, Yin Wood, Yang 
Fire, Yin Fire, Yang Earth, Yin Earth, Yang Metal, Yin Metal, Yang Water, 
Yin Water.  (www.astro-fengshui.com) 
Some will know that 2002 is the year of the Water Horse, and this is what is 
known as a pillar. The Horse represents the Earthly Branch, while the Water 
represents the Heavenly Stem and together, they make the Year Pillar for 
2002. (www.hiakz.com) 
There are 10 Heavenly Stems and 12 Earthly Branches. They have either 
yin or yang properties as well as elemental property of the Five Elements as 
shown in the table below. [sic]   
(www.absolutelyfengshui.com) 
 
Though there is no empirical evidence at this point, I am inclined to believe that 
perception of a (rational) homology would best be facilitated by an overt historical 
explanation, with the next best alternative being the deployment of persuasive strategies 
like those used by Yap (2005).  Conversely, completely overlooking this aspect could 
well be facilitating the unfavourable perception of unmotivated arbitrariness instead – 
an ironic consequence that the authors of these popular websites intending to promote 
Ba Zi would surely want to avoid.  It should be stated, however, that my intuitions 
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regarding the relative persuasiveness of these strategies would certainly require 
empirical confirmation, ideally through some form of survey research.   
 
5.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
While Chapter 4 dealt with how metaphors fulfil rationality criteria, the more 
fundamental question of why particular metaphorical source domains should be 
regarded as suitable was largely unanswered.  Particularly for Ba Zi, where there is no 
immediately plausible conceptual link between characters and elements, a seemingly 
unmotivated appropriation of the latter as a source domain appears to be an irrational 
move.  In the specific context of investigating the role of metaphors in a rational system, 
we can thus stipulate the requirement of a plausible conceptual link, or homology 
between source and target, as an additional rationality criterion.   In this chapter I have 
argued that the perceived lack of homology in Ba Zi is largely due to the increasing 
rarity of experiential scenes in which the unrelated aspects of characters, temporality 
and elements actually co-occur, citing examples from both agriculture and larger-scale 
political events.  As an alternative to invoking historical details, which might prove 
superfluous and uninteresting for contemporary Ba Zi learners, writers/practitioners 
have the option of reinstating this lost homology through a variety of persuasive visual 
and textual strategies outlined in this chapter. 
As a point of larger interest, the present insight into loss of homology as a consequence 
of shifting socio-cultural practices (e.g. decreasing dependence on agriculture) is a 
timely reminder of the need to maintain a historically and culturally sensitive 
perspective on what counts as an acceptable metaphor, which for our purposes 
eventually determines what counts as a rational system as well.  While many sources 
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and targets manifest inherent, timeless and universal conceptual resemblances26, the 
case of Ba Zi has demonstrated that source-target homology can also be a function of 
prevailing socio-cultural values and beliefs, the careful consideration of which is 
certainly more fruitful than relying on an overly decontextualized snapshot of any 
system (cf. Goddard, 2004).  It is in this sense that the notion of rationality cannot be 
regarded as purely conceptual and autonomous of the larger contexts which rational 
systems find themselves embedded in, an observation which recalls the Weberian 
outlook reviewed in Chapter 2.  Indeed, exploring the social aspects of conceptual 
metaphors- especially how source-domain choice is affected by particular social 
paradigms, and the attendant effects on perceptions of rationality – would in my opinion 
be a fascinating and highly important addition to the present work.   Any successful 
undertaking in this direction can claim itself as a major piece of the eternal language-
cognition-culture puzzle.  
Up to this point, I have covered most of the thesis’ objectives, from the introduction of 
a more encompassing set of rationality criteria decoupled from intrinsic scientificity, to 
suggesting how conceptual metaphors can be a resource for their fulfilment.  I have also 
contextualized these notions through a case study of Ba Zi, from which I have 
tentatively suggested a further aspect of the relationship between metaphor and 
rationality – namely, the issue of source-target homology constraining source domain 
choice.  In the next chapter, my intention is to continue sketching initial ideas regarding 
the nature of the metaphor-rationality relationship, from which future theorizing and 
research might, it is hoped, emerge.  This thesis has thus far made the assumption that 
rationality is ontologically separate from and independent of metaphor, which is 
                                                           
26
 This is of course especially true for the Lakovian line of metaphor research, where source-target 
relationships are usually claimed to be embodied, and a result of our human neurobiological makeup.     
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conceptualized as a non-necessary “resource” in facilitating the former.  In Chapter 6, I 
discuss the possibility of reformulating this relationship, particularly how we can 
conceptualize “rationality” and its criteria as being a product of conceptual metaphors 



















DOES METAPHOR FACILITATE OR CONSTITUTE RATIONALITY? 
6.0 THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES  
By this point, I hope I have impressed upon the reader the relationship that exists 
between metaphor as a mode of language and thought, and rationality as a concept 
entailing sub-notions like internal consistency and validity which have a far greater 
ambit than scientific inquiry.  However, the precise nature of this relationship has thus 
far not been critically reflected upon.  Some distinctive possibilities emerge, if we 
consider the question in ontological terms: We could view metaphors as being confined 
to a facilitating role, which assumes that rationality is ontologically independent of 
metaphor.  Alternatively, based on the theoretical conviction that metaphor is a primary 
mechanism of thought, we have grounds to speculate that “rationality” is itself a 
product of metaphorical construal, a perspective which regards metaphors as 
constitutive of rationality.   
In this chapter I elaborate on these variant viewpoints, noting that this thesis falls 
largely under the former perspective, while offering some ideas on how the latter 
perspective might be pursued.  I then proceed to suggest a further option which I think 
can be fruitfully characterized by dominant ideas in cognitive psychology and cognitive 
linguistics – namely, prototype categorization and the theory of idealized cognitive 
models (ICMs) (Lakoff:1987). This third possibility would to a great extent depart from 
the present criteria-driven approach to rationality, given that prototype and ICM 
theories tend to question the viability of necessary and sufficient conditions as a means 
of demarcating categories and concepts.  It should be noted that this chapter is best 
87 
 
regarded as supplementary to the main thesis, in the sense that it consists mainly of 
critical self-reflection regarding the ideas presented thus far, as well as tentative 
directions for future research.    
  
6.1 METAPHOR AS FACILITATING RATIONALITY 
This approach essentially maintains a fundamental separation between metaphor and 
rationality, since the extent of their interaction is theorized to be non-necessary and 
largely strategic in nature.  Recall that the existence of metaphors is not always for the 
sake of fulfilling rationality criteria, as in the case of explanatory metaphors (Section 
3.1.1). Also, the set of knowledge/belief systems which do employ rationality criteria-
fulfilling metaphors is a mere subset of all rational systems, and there is little more than 
an intuitive hunch, based on the supposed pervasiveness of metaphor, that this subset is 
a significantly large one.  Furthermore, the presence of metaphors alone does not 
guarantee membership in the subset, since metaphors do not automatically fulfil the 
criteria (see, for example, my discussion of “metaphorical dogmatism” in Section 3.2, 
and the homology requirement in Chapter 5).  In other words, metaphors are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for rationality.   
Within such an approach, there is also no explicit need to consider how metaphor may 
or may not be involved in the initial formulation of rationality criteria themselves.  
Once we accept a particular set of independently obtained criteria as sufficient in 
conferring the status of being rational to a system that fulfils them, we are able to 
delineate the boundary between rationality and irrationality without making any 
reference to metaphor. This however certainly does not imply that there is nothing far-
reaching in this approach, since the potential for the set of metaphor-employing systems 
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to intersect the set of rational systems is now highlighted.  The relationship between 
rational/irrational systems and metaphors described above is summarized in the 












6.2 METAPHOR AS CONSTITUTING RATIONALITY 
In the highly influential conceptualist paradigm, which argues for the treatment of 
metaphor as a basic and universal cognitive phenomenon, the inclination towards 
postulating an overarching metaphor mechanism for various abstract conceptions such 
as causation and temporality comes as no surprise. Typically, the claim is that such 
Universal set of all systems 
 
Set of rational systems (i.e. fulfil rationality criteria) 





A= A rational system without employment of metaphor 
B= A system where metaphors are employed for explanatory/expository purposes  
C= A system where metaphors fulfil rationality criteria (e.g. Ba Zi) 
D= A system where metaphors fail to fulfil rationality criteria (e.g. due to 
metaphorical dogmatism, absence of homology) 





concepts are “embodied” and structured by the nature of the functioning of our human 
bodies in the socio-physical world, rather than objectively pre-existing “out there”. This 
implies that any attempt to analyze the internal structure of abstract concepts would 
inevitably reveal their dependence on the patterns of our sensorimotor experiences, such 
as those described by primary metaphors (see Section 3.0) and image-schemas (Johnson, 
1989).  If metaphors indeed underlie what we might describe as our human 
comprehension of the basic teleological features of the world, there is theoretical 
motivation to examine how human judgments of the rationality of knowledge/belief 
systems, or even our very capacity to be rational, are themselves metaphorically 
structured.  We can thus expect components of rationality such as internal consistency 
(our criterion B) and logical validity (criterion C) to be shaped by primary metaphors 
and/or image-schemas, instead of possessing an objective, pre-existing legitimacy.  A 
strong claim under such a perspective might read something like “to be rational is to be 
metaphorical”, where thinking rationally inevitably involves certain conceptual 
metaphors that are tied up with our bodily architecture vis-à-vis the socio-physical 
world we reside in.  There are therefore no “objective” criteria for rationality in the 
sense of a disembodied set of principles which stand independent of the nature of the 
agents of rationality (i.e. humans).    
As a starting point, one might collect various linguistic examples of the way we talk 
about reasoning processes, and see if any pervasive metaphorical patterns emerge.  
Cross-linguistic data revealing similar metaphors would of course be a welcome 
corroboration for the argument of universality.   Importantly, one should also try to find 
examples that do not rely on metaphor in order to falsify the original claim.  For 
instance, many English expressions seem to construe rational thinking in terms of 
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progression along an ideally linear path, with the initial premises as the starting point 
(as in the beginning of this paragraph!), the process of argument as movement, and the 
conclusion as destination (e.g. “I started from this idea and arrived at that conclusion”, 
“Your reasoning is going around in circles”).  Many other expressions also construe 
rational idea-formation as a physical building process (e.g. “I built upon her ideas”, 
“The structure of your argument is strong”).  In the first set of examples we see a 
reliance on the “source-path-goal” schema (Johnson, 1989), while in the second set we 
see image-schemas of support, contact etc.  On the other hand, there don’t appear to be 
too many expressions that describe rational thinking in strictly non-metaphorical or 
non-image-schematic terms.  This line of argument points to the conclusion that we can 
have pluralistic ways of construing rationality, but all of them must implicate metaphors, 
especially those involving bodily-based image schemas.  Our rationality criterion C, for 
example (Claims and conclusions drawn on the basis of the knowledge/beliefs must 
demonstrably follow from them in a way deemed reasonably valid by relevant rules of 
inference), already appears to manifest the source-path-goal schema, with conclusions 
following from premises.   
A further step within this approach might then be to move from general linguistic 
expressions of rational thinking, to looking for metaphors underlying specific patterns 
of rational reasoning.   In the case of deductive reasoning, evidence from Aristotle’s 
explication of its fundamentals reveals the possibility that its main tenets are 
metaphorically conceptualized, at least by Aristotle himself.  Declaring in Prior 
Analytics “that one term should be included in another, as in a whole, is the same as for 
the other to be predicated of all of the first”, Aristotle conceptualized predicative 
sentences (e.g. “Sue is wearing red”) in terms of inclusion in categories (i.e. “Sue is in 
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the category of red entities”).  There is in turn evidence that the logic of categories is 
frequently construed in container-schema terms, with container boundaries mapping 
onto categorical boundaries.  The logic of container-schema dictates, for example, that  
i)         given a container and an entity, the entity is either inside or outside 
and not simultaneously both 
ii) if container A is physically inside container B, and entity C is inside 
container A, then entity C is insider container B 
iii) if A is inside B, and C is outside B, then C is outside A. (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1999:380)   
When these logical constraints are mapped unto Aristotelian principles, (i) would yield 
the law of the excluded middle, while (ii) and (iii) yield modus ponens and modus 
tollens respectively.   If it can be shown that predication and categories are not just 
described, but psychologically understood in terms of containment and containers 
respectively (e.g. via the metaphors PREDICATION IS CONTAINMENT and CATEGORIES 
ARE CONTAINERS), then we might have good evidence for the ultimately metaphorical 
basis of rational deduction.  The circumscribed nature of deductive reasoning, rendered 
by well-defined boundaries of its metaphorical containers, could also explain why we 
perceive deduction to be monotonic27 while other modes of reasoning not amenable to a 
container analysis (e.g. induction) are perceived to be non-monotonic.  Once an entity is 
in the inner container, nothing short of its (contradictory) removal will change its status 
as being in the outer container as well.  To reiterate, for the purposes of arguing that 
                                                           
27
 In monotonic modes of reasoning such as deductive modus ponens, established facts or conclusions 
cannot be invalidated by the addition of new information. For instance, given that the streets would be 
wet if it rained, plus the fact that it indeed rained, nothing short of a contradictory premise can change the 
conclusion that the streets would be wet.   
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metaphors constitute deductive reasoning, one needs to show that the above description 
is not an instance of an explanatory metaphor (Section 3.1.1) but of a constitutive one 
(Section 3.1.3).  The same goes for all other modes of rational reasoning, if one were to 
claim that metaphor constitutes rationality altogether.   
 
6.3 A THIRD OPTION: RATIONALITY AS A PROTOTYPE CATEGORY 
In the introductory chapter, I briefly discussed the ideological repercussions of 
conflating science with rationality, which allows the presentation of scientific methods 
and agendas as inherently ideal, often at the expense of alternative modes of 
knowledge/beliefs.  Although I attempted to undermine the scientific-nonscientific 
divide that lies at the heart of the rational-irrational chasm by suggesting a more 
encompassing set of rationality criteria,  the emancipatory usefulness of such a gesture 
is bound to be limited if we still cannot transcend the basic rational-irrational 
dichotomy.  Even if some broader set of rationality criteria were to gain currency, the 
tendency to castigate irrationality still remains, though no longer on a scientific-
nonscientific front, but on whichever front the new criteria demarcate.  
Our inability to transcend dichotomies is a direct consequence of adopting a criterial 
approach to rationality, which strongly suggests the operation of necessary and 
sufficient conditions in determining whether a system is rational.  In the present account, 
to fail a single criterion sufficiently constitutes irrationality, while passing all 
constitutes the opposite.  For all the rigour that this approach offers, the classification of 
systems according to objectively construed necessary/sufficient conditions seems to be 
an ironic echo of the classical scientific objectivism which is frowned upon in the first 
place.     
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A plausible alternative to the criterial approach follows naturally from the discovery of 
prototype effects, or internal gradience as a characteristic of a wide variety of categories 
used to classify the world.  Although initial research focused on concrete objects like 
birds and furniture (see Section 2.0), demonstrating that people perceive certain types of 
birds/furniture etc. as “better” or more prototypical examples of their respective 
categories, the same tendency has been shown to also exist in more abstract categories 
such as language structure (Taylor, 1998) and unconventional ones such as “things to 
take from one’s home during a fire”, “what to get for a birthday present” etc (Barsalou 
1983,1984).  It would therefore make sense to theorize “rational systems” as a category 
in which some systems (e.g. physical sciences) are perceived to be most prototypically 
rational, while others (e.g. social sciences) less so in a manner not amounting to 
irrationality (cf. MacDonald’s (1994) academic knowledge continuum).  The task 
would then be to discover the cause behind such prototype effects, such as when certain 
systems align more with idealized perceptions (i.e. ICMs) we have of the world even 
though these systems are adequately similar by virtue of passing some rationality 
criteria.  Taking a linguistic example, although the category of “bachelors” appears to 
be adequately defined as “unmarried adult men”, a feral boy who has grown up devoid 
of  human contact or the Pope himself would not properly be considered good examples 
of bachelors.  Fillmore (1982) argues that this is because bachelorhood is not just a 
purely semantic category, but is motivated by expectations regarding idealized societal 
notions such as marriage eligibility.  Investigating what expectations and ICMs lie 
behind the privileged perception of the physical sciences as most rational would lead us 
right back into socio-historically grounded processes of ideological formation, where 




6.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
There are different approaches to theorizing the relationship between metaphor and 
rationality, depending on one’s assumptions about the ontological status of each.  Most 
distinctly, metaphors can either be treated as a conceptual resource which brings about 
the fulfillment of some set of rationality criteria, or as constituting the criteria 
themselves.  These alternative positions are not contradictory, for both can be equally 
true.  Metaphors that constitute rationality involve highly generic and embodied 
mappings (e.g. container-schemas) which could explain the intuitive validity of certain 
standard rules of inference (e.g. modus ponens, modus tollens), while those that help 
fulfill rationality criteria involve more specific and concrete source domain knowledge 
structures as we have seen in examples throughout this thesis.  Yet another option of 
conceptualizing rationality within the larger cognitivist framework is to view the 
category of rational systems as one that exhibits prototype effects, which results in the 
perception of some systems as more rational than others.  This approach would de-
emphasize the intrinsic differences between systems and place more interest in the 
source(s) of these prototype effects, leading to a more socio-cognitively oriented 
analysis.       
In Chapter 7, the final chapter of the thesis, I begin by summing up the theoretical and 
ideological debates which motivated the thesis’ claims, briefly retracing the steps taken 
to arrive at its conclusions.  I end the thesis by commenting on how it has shed some 
light on both pre-existing themes, as well as new themes which have emerged in the 






7.0 SUMMARY OF CLAIMS AND FINDINGS 
Although the point of departure for this thesis had been an observation of ideological 
processes in action, where a contemporary conflation between rationality and scientific 
inquiry was shown to exacerbate the normative chasm between science and non-science, 
the direction I have taken is not so much to actively champion supposedly irrational 
systems, but to explore how rationality as a notion could be reframed.  More 
specifically, I have argued that rationality should neither be circumscribed by science 
nor relegated to an entirely relativistic and vacuous construct, leading to the suggestion 
of a set of working criteria (Chapter 2) which might be used for the critical examination 
of any knowledge/belief system.  I showed that the fulfilment of these criteria is 
intimately related to the question of whether human beings, in their fundamental role as 
knowers/believers, play an active part not merely in understanding or processing these 
systems, but in conceptualizing them through the range of creative cognitive resources 
we are endowed with.  As I have demonstrated, this question lies at the heart of the 
massive debate between individuals such as analytic philosophers on the one hand, and 
contemporary cognitive psychologists and linguists, on the other.   
This thesis has oriented itself with the position generally held by cognitive 
psychologists and linguists – that rational thought is not an internal, algorithmic process 
of recovering and representing pre-existing, objective properties, but a dynamic process 
of conceptualization involving various cognitive resources afforded by our bodily and 
socio-cultural interactions with the external world – and examined how one such 
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creative cognitive resource, i.e. conceptual metaphor, can be employed in 
knowledge/belief systems in a way that fulfils my suggested set of rationality criteria.  I 
showed in Chapter 3 that the facilitating relationship between metaphor and rationality 
tends to be strategic rather than necessary or sufficient, since metaphors present in 
systems do not always function as conceptualizing resources (e.g. explanatory 
metaphors serve pedagogical purposes, as outlined in Section 3.1.1), and in certain 
cases, seem almost to be detrimental for the criteria (e.g. where inferential richness 
within the source results in a dogmatic unwillingness to consider evidence inherent to 
the target system, as discussed in Section 3.2). My case study of Ba Zi in Chapters 4 
and 5 served two main purposes – firstly, to show that a system most likely seen as 
categorically irrational turns out to look rather different once the role of metaphors is 
brought under the spotlight.  Secondly, with specific regard to the relationship between 
metaphor and rationality, the presence of a clear homology between a metaphor’s 
source and target was seen to operate as an additional criterion to be fulfilled.  More 
significantly, it was highlighted that the nature of this homology can change over time, 
is sensitive to socio-historical considerations, and can be rhetorically constructed.  This 
is a timely reminder that the notion of rationality cannot be regarded as purely 
conceptual and autonomous of the larger contexts within which rational systems are 
embedded, and I emphasize the need for future work to consider the social aspects of 
rationality, such as how prevalent social paradigms could exercise a strategic constraint 
on felicitous source-domain choice.  
It was in this spirit of theoretical self-reflection that Chapter 6 attempted to suggest 
alternative ways of theorizing the relationship between metaphor and rationality.  One 
can, for instance, fully pursue the conviction that conceptual metaphors fundamentally 
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underlie all of abstract thought by examining how rationality is itself a product of 
metaphor, or one can go in the previously mentioned social direction by examining the 
effects that prevalent societal attitudes, perceptions, worldviews etc. (i.e. components of 
ICMs) have on rationality judgments.   Notwithstanding my analysis and establishment 
of one aspect of the relationship between metaphors and rationality, I hope that this 
thesis has also suggested some definite directions for future like-minded research to 
proceed – the more psychologically-oriented direction of discovering possible 
metaphorical bases underlying rational inference-making,  or the more socially-oriented 
direction of discovering how successful deployment of metaphors may depend less on 
the cognitive validity of cross-domain mappings than on social sanction and rhetorical 
persuasion.  
I now conclude the thesis in the next three sections by briefly commenting on the light 
it has shed on three themes that were at the heart of my research or have emerged in its 
course.  In none of these should my comments be taken as exhaustive, as each of these 
themes independently generate a great deal of contemporary and multi-disciplinary 
research in their own right.      
 
7.1 RATIONALITY  - A PROPERTY OF THE KNOWLEDGE OR THE 
KNOWER? 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the notion of a systematic, inviolable order to the universe 
independent of human construal is a formidable legacy of the Enlightenment era and 
has been foundational in the development of modern scientific inquiry.  In this 
conception, human beings play the role of knowledge discoverer, unearthing objective 
properties of entities and relations between entities.  Though criteria such as 
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“intersubjective verifiability” appeared to implicate humans directly in knowledge 
formation processes, the underlying assumption emphasized quite the opposite – human 
observation and conceptualization were supposed to be neutral to rational knowledge 
and thus a variable to be eliminated.  In understanding the workings of objective world 
knowledge, the human mind functioned mostly as a passive mirror. It is only relatively 
recently that new fields of research, particularly cognitive psychology, have emerged to 
suggest the role of human cognition in imposing structures onto the objective world.  
This alternative view shifted any potential discussion of rationality from the 
disembodied, external world to the newly discovered mechanisms of the human body 
and mind.    
Much like those who favour neither extremity and accept that the human capacity for 
conceptualization is ultimately “embedded in a more encompassing biological, 
psychological and cultural context” (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991:173), it is 
hoped that this thesis has demonstrated that the cognitive resource of conceptual 
metaphors is hardly employed in isolation of stable, objective world knowledge, and 
that the construal and constitution of a target system via some source necessarily 
presupposes the well-formedness of the source – a well-formedness that often goes back 
to being describable as “objectivist”.  Recall the example of Ba Zi, where the felicity of 
the Productive, Controlling and Weakening Cycles hinges upon the objective physical 
properties of material substances.  What we see here is therefore a productive alliance-
of-sorts between the cognitive endowments of human beings and the stable properties 
of the material world in which we reside, and the emergent hybridity is one that 
appropriately reminds us of our inextricable and contributory role towards sustaining a 
rational world in which rational knowledge is possible. 
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7.2 DOES “RATIONAL” MEAN “RELIABLE”? 
In the opening paragraphs of this thesis, I commented that rationality tends to be 
associated with an inherent idealness and perceived as crucial for the general progress 
of human society.  The generally positive diagnosis of Ba Zi under my set of rationality 
criteria could thus easily be read as an attempt to subtly, if not overtly proclaim Ba Zi 
and other similar systems as trustworthy, reliable or even “correct”.  Other than 
clarifying that I have no particular sympathy towards Ba Zi, the issue of larger concern 
already briefly mentioned in Section 6.3 is that a new set of rationality criteria may 
succeed at reclassifying systems previously thought to be irrational, but cannot by itself 
eliminate polarized perceptions of rational-as-ideal and irrational-as-detrimental.  In 
other words, this thesis does not, and cannot, say anything about whether “rational 
systems” should be embraced and “irrational systems” discarded.  Claims about the 
epistemic nature of knowledge/belief systems generally do not suffice to warrant a re-
evaluation of these systems along normative or ideological frontiers.   As such, any 
attempt to trumpet Ba Zi etc. as trustworthy and reliable solely on the grounds of their 
passing a set of epistemically-oriented criteria serves only to perpetuate the non-critical 
perception of rational systems as good, and irrational systems as bad.  True to the non-
problematic indifference with which irrationality can be held by some, it is illuminating 
to quote the words of American poet Walt Whitman, who in “Song of Myself” 
announced, “Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself. (I am large, I 
contain multitudes)”.  Not only does Whitman render irrationality non-problematic, 





7.3 METONYMY AS A BASIS OF METAPHOR – “METAPHTONOMY”? 
The postulation of metaphor and metonymy as separate processes in the cognitive 
linguistic tradition crucially hinges upon whether mappings occur across two distinct 
conceptual domains, or within a single domain.  This presupposes an uncontroversial 
delineation of domain boundaries, but the not infrequent difficulty of doing so has 
prompted some (e.g. Radden 2002) to conceive of a metonym-metaphor continuum 
instead, aptly described as “metaphtonomy”, following Goosens’ (1990) original 
coinage of the term to capture metonym-metaphor interactions in language.   
Considering both ends of this hypothesized continuum, an exemplar of metaphor would 
be a set of mappings across two distinct domains motivated by some structural 
homology (i.e. image-schematic structure), while an exemplary metonym would require 
a demonstrable contiguity between the concerned elements.  Cases in between which 
pose definitional difficulties are those where the two supposedly distinct domains can 
arguably be collapsed into a single larger domain, either as a result of variations in 
conceptual classification or more interestingly, when there are specific experiential 
scenes in which the two concerned domains co-occur.   Taylor’s (2002) analysis of the 
primary metaphor MORE IS UP, which may well extend to all primary metaphors in 
general, is a case-in-point.  Though quantity and verticality are sufficiently distinct 
notions, the regularity with which they co-occur (e.g pouring liquid into a glass causing 
the water level to rise) suggests that a metonymic account along the lines of experiential 
contiguity is also plausible, and may have motivated the metaphorical mapping in the 
first place.  Barcelona (2000:35-44) goes as far as to claim that all conceptual 
metaphors presuppose conceptual metonymy, based on the observation that a single 
conceptual metaphor seldom exhaustively characterizes the entire target domain, which 
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suggests a metonymic pre-selection within the target, which in turn imposes selection 
restrictions on the source.  He gives the example of the metaphor DEVIANT COLOURS 
ARE DEVIANT SOUNDS (e.g. “This yellow is too loud”), which is productive only for a 
metonymic sub-class within the target domain of colours (i.e. “colours that 
involuntarily attract attention”),  and recruits inferences from the metonymic 
counterpart in the source domain of sounds (i.e. “sounds that involuntarily attract 
attention”).  What we have is therefore a metaphorical mapping across two 
metonymically structured domains (also see Baldauf, 2003 for discussions of “sub-
concepts” constituting target domains).   
These perspectives, which suggest that cross-domain metaphorical mappings are 
generally preceded by some form of internal metonymic mapping, find some support in 
my analysis of Ba Zi.  The idea that concrete experiential contiguity precedes a more 
abstract structural homology is evidenced by my discussion of “agricultural scenes”, 
where the initial correlation between time periods and salient manifestation of 
elemental properties is gradually abstracted away as Ba Zi develops theoretically.  In 
the process of this development, where temporal details of an individual’s birth 
eventually came to (metonymically) represent the totality of the individual herself 
(recall the concept of “Day Master” from Section 4.4), we also detect semblances of 
Barcelona’s ideas in action. 
The main implication for this work is that if metonymies interact with metaphors in 
such a fundamental way, then the motivation for considering only metaphors and how 
they facilitate rationality may be slightly misplaced.  Assumptions about the primacy of 
metaphors in cognition would have to be revised in the wake of a more integrated and 
unified account detailing the metonym-metaphor relationship.  The achievement of this 
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endeavour would compel a fruitful expansion of the present work by reassessing the 
complicated stock of conceptualization resources we have at our means to achieve 
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